

**The Intersection of Culture and Radicalism:  
Analyzing Disaffection, Norms, and Resistance**

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**Abstract:**

Radicalization in Pakistan has frequently taken center stage in national discussions and has raised serious concerns for the government and society. The goal of this study is to investigate the cultural elements that contribute to radicalization in Pakistan. This study employs a qualitative research design and both descriptive and analytical method for a contextual interpretation of cultural phenomena. Data collection relies on a dual-triangulation strategy incorporating both primary and secondary sources. A purposive sampling technique was applied to conduct interviews from the targeted population of academicians, researchers and policy analysts. Thematic analysis technique was used to scrutinize the data. The central thesis of the research is that intricate processes of cultural transformation are taking place in Pakistan and that the country's culture is evolving. The processes of cultural transformation, political culture, folk culture, national and local cultures, and monoculture are analyzed in the paper. It is argued that one of the causes of radicalization has been Pakistan's cultural realities. The main cultural factors of radicalization in Pakistan are the highly skewed educational system, the deeply divided and sectarian religious culture, and the wildly unequal economic culture.

**Keywords:** Pakistan, disaffection, radicalization, resistance, economic culture, religious culture, educational culture

**INTRODUCTION**

The term "culture" is fairly broad. Some believe that the idea of culture offers a set of guidelines for deciphering and comprehending human behavior. Culture is the conventional way of thinking and acting that is passed down from one generation to the next through learning rather than biological inheritance. These ways of thinking and acting include values, beliefs, rules of conduct, political structure, economic activity, and the like (Hatch, 1985). A nation or group's habits, beliefs, art, and social structure are all considered to be components of their culture. Ahmed characterizes culture as the capacity for enjoyment. The inventive ways in which a community amuses itself make up a large portion of what we refer to as culture (Ahmed, 2006). Another definition of culture is a system of symbols. A basic idea in the study of cultural anthropology is that culture is a learned tradition and the primary factor influencing behavior. Because of the process of socialization or enculturation, humans display a vast range of behavioral manifestations (Hatch, 1985).

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There are political, economic, and religious aspects to culture. Cultural processes have an effect on one's personality. It is impossible to perceive or understand personality and culture apart from the aforementioned elements. Cultural anthropologists Clifford Geertz and David Schneider argue that cultural systems need to be differentiated from social systems and first examined as internally coherent wholes (Hatch, 1985). Calhoun defined radicalism as fundamental or radical political challenges to the status quo (Calhoun, 1985). When someone or a group refers to themselves as "radical," it carries a little less negative connotation than "extremist" (Judge, 2005). Radical movements and groups share the following traits and ideologies: (a) there is a feeling of hopelessness that nothing less than drastic actions will suffice. (b) It is believed that the current global system must be destroyed. (c) Power sharing and compromise are disapproved of. (d) There are plans for a new global order. (e) The methods are justified by the goal. (f) A feeling of haste and impatience. (g) There is some allure to the possibility of drastic change (Flaherty & Kalogerakis, 2007).

In a survey, most radicals were found to be less social and to keep mostly to themselves (Sohail, 2007). Radical ideas are more likely to attract those with lower cultural attainment than others. Radicals could be seen as less gregarious people who have not had their socialization properly handled. They find social interaction with others to be unpleasant. They appear to have different ideas about happiness and enjoyment than the rest of society.

In Pakistan, radicalization has frequently taken center stage in discussions and has grown to be a major source of anxiety for the government and the public. Both society and the state bear some of the blame for the problem of radicalization. Radicalization in Pakistani society has expanded and persisted due to several social, economic, political, and historical elements. Regional factors and major power politics have also played their role. This study aims to investigate the cultural elements that contribute to the nation's radicalization. Five cultural dimensions—educational, media, political, economic, and folk—as well as seven cultural issues or challenges—aversion to performing arts, feeling of dis-ownership, resistance to national culture and monoculture, conspiracy theories, acculturation, and material and reflexive norms—are the focus of the analysis.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

There has not been much research done on the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan. Thus, very few systematic studies have been carried out on the topic. Sohail Abbas, Shabana Fayyaz, Christine Fair, Ayesha Jalal, Amir Rana, and Tariq Rahman are among those who have conducted these kinds of studies. A European perspective on Islamic militancy has been illuminated by Tahir Abbas. The roots and spread of radicalization in Eurasia are covered in his book *Islamic Political Radicalism*. He has written extensively about the international political context of radicalism among Muslims (Tahir, 2007). Ayesha Jalal has addressed the topic within the context of South Asia (Jalal, 2001, 2008).

*The Gateway to Terrorism* gives vital information about national radical movements and organizations (Rana, 2003). The development and ubiquity of extremism in Pakistan are covered in *The Seeds of Terrorism* (Rana, 2005). "Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan" provides examples of how radicalism in Pakistan is encouraged by the jihadi media (Rana, 2008). Haqqani has written about the beliefs of extreme South Asian Jihadi groups (Haqqani, 2005). Hassan Abbas attempts to

address some issues surrounding Pakistani radicalization, such as 9/11 and Pakistani radical organizations (Hassan, 2004). Christine Fair has examined cultural factors and expressions of radicalization in Pakistan and its worldwide connections (Fair, 2004, 2008).

Kaul has addressed the effects of Muslim radicalization on Pakistan's military and civil life (Kaul, 2002). *The Failure of Political Islam* by Olivier Roy discusses radicalism and radical organizations in Pakistan and the Middle East (Roy, 1994). The topic is clarified by Stern (Stern, 2004). Curricula and educational systems have a part in radicalization in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Davis, 2007).

In *Combating Terrorism*, Chitkara talks about the phenomena of radicalization and its causes in Pakistan. He also deals with several radical groups (Chitkara, 2003). Regarding radicalization in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto has covered several topics, including how it relates to jihad (Benazir, 2008). Irfan Ahmed discussed radicalization and Jamaat-e-Islami of India in his paper "Between moderation and radicalization" (Irfan, 2005). Dyer et al. (2007) explain that preradicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action are the four stages of the radicalization process. The relationship in the country between radicalization and poverty has been studied by Safiya Aftab (2008). Shabana Fayyaz (2019) highlights the influence of violent extremism on Pakistani youth and child militancy in Pakistan.

Kuper (1985) observes that many writers think that culture is the primary factor influencing behavior. In general, it appears to be accurate, but not when it comes to radical behavior. The majority would have become radical if culture served as the primary predictor of radical behavior. The authors have merely touched on the cultural aspects in the context of their research. This paper is focused on analyzing the cultural aspects of the spread of the phenomenon of radicalization in the country.

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This study employs a qualitative research design to explore the complex dynamics underlying the intersection of culture and radicalism, focusing specifically on how disaffection, cultural norms, and resistance mechanisms interact. The framework is both descriptive and analytical, allowing for a contextual interpretation of cultural phenomena rather than mere statistical correlation. Data collection relies on a dual-triangulation strategy incorporating both primary and secondary sources. Secondary data comprises a desk review of existing academic literature. The primary data was gathered through semi-structured interviews, a method chosen for its flexibility in allowing participants to express complex attitudes, lived experiences, and personal values regarding systemic disaffection. The target population for this study consists of senior administrative staff, academic faculty, and key institutional stakeholders within public sector universities in Pakistan—a sector highly relevant for analyzing deep-rooted hierarchies and power distances. Given the specialized and sensitive nature of the topic, a purposive sampling technique was applied. The gathered qualitative data from these interviews was subsequently subjected to thematic analysis.

## **CULTURE AND RADICALIZATION**

Radicalism has expanded in Pakistan partly due to several factors related to the country's national culture, including media, education, politics, economy, and religion. Radical attitudes and behaviors may be influenced by several aspects of Pakistani culture, such as the distaste for and

discouragement of leisure, the distaste for the performing arts, a sense of dis-ownership and deprivation, pervasive conspiracy theories and stereotypes, views and misperceptions of global society, resistance against the national culture, and the cultures of education, the media, and religion. In the following lines, cultural dimensions and challenges with reference to radicalization in Pakistan are analyzed.


### Cultural Dimensions

Five dimensions of Pakistani culture are examined to understand the connection between culture and radicalization: educational, media, political, economic, and folk (Figure 1).

#### Educational Culture

The school system in Pakistan has not been able to adequately instill in the populace the kind of cultural values that are desired for a peaceful existence. Seldom do the curricula include lessons on these topics. Pakistani folklore<sup>2</sup> is one instance. Even many Pakistani academics are unaware of it, as are the general people (Sabeeha 1991: 268). It is the fault of the educational system and society at large that children are not instilled with basic social attitudes that will constructively channel their energies. They can be transformed into desirable social beings—possibly social workers—with the right instruction and training.

**Figure 1:** Cultural aspects and dimensions



Rahman (2006) divided Pakistani educational institutions into four main groups: cadet colleges, elite English-medium, madrassahs, and Urdu-medium schools. Different social and economic classes are catered by these various systems. Their infrastructures, fee and salary structures, and curricula differ greatly from one another. Rahman reported that the average cost per student per year in madrassahs was 5700 rupees (including board and lodging), 5500 rupees (only tuition) in Urdu-medium educational institutions, 96000 rupees for 'A' Level and 36000 rupees (only tuition)

<sup>2</sup> Folklore mainly comprises folk speech and folk material culture. Folk speech means proverbs, songs, riddles, beliefs, superstitions, tales, customs, fables, ballads, magical episodes, legends, the sagas, etc. Folk material culture means "physical objects produced in traditional ways, folk architecture, folk arts, folk crafts, design and decoration of buildings, utensils, the shape of fans, etc. (Sabeeha 1991: 268–271).

for other levels in English-medium schools/colleges, and 90000 rupees (all facilities) in cadet schools/colleges (Rahman, 2006).

The way that staff members and instructors handle pupils is also like this. It is customary for public schools and madrassahs to use corporal punishment on their students. They are also frequently insulted by the faculty and staff. These two kinds of schools give their students a feeling of powerlessness. Their sense of respect and self-worth are severely harmed, if not completely shattered, when they graduate or leave school. As they get older and realize they cannot compete with English-medium school, cadet school, and cadet college graduates for jobs, their sense of powerlessness grows. That sometimes drives individuals to take their own lives. If this kind of deprivation can drive people to take their own lives, why cannot it also drive them to exact revenge on some of the people who, in the radicals' opinion, are either part of the system that causes their deprivation or are responsible for it?

The social sciences are crucial in promoting moderate attitudes and behaviors as well as moderate practices and ideals. Nonetheless, the government and community in Pakistan have not given the social sciences enough emphasis. Even though social science departments are found in many colleges and universities, they are generally ignored. The power elites appear to be deliberately ignoring the social sciences, most likely because they equip the graduates with critical thinking.

### ***Media Culture***

One of the most effective instruments for controlling the socialization process is the media. It gives such information which encourages viewers and readers to regard radicals with sympathy (Azam, 2008). Undoubtedly, it elevates radicals inadvertently. There is a chance that some viewers and readers will eventually turn radicals. Radicalization has always increased and spread due in part to Pakistani media (Azam, 2008). One of the five reasons listed by Farhana that determined the spread of violence after 9/11 was the media's participation (Farhana, 2008). Certain media outlets are successful in stifling news and stories about social and cultural events (Rauf, personal communication, Nov. 12, 2008). As Abdul Qadeer explains, there is a dualistic pattern to the cultural shifts brought about by the widespread use of radio, television, video, and social media; certain ideas and customs are reinforced and reinvented while others are replaced. One could argue that the "messages" that the new "mediums" convey influence how Pakistani society reacts to them (Qadeer 2006: 136-7).

In Pakistan's patriarchal society, beating or killing someone is considered a sign of bravery. How these activities are portrayed in the media inspires others to carry out similar deeds (I. A. Rahman, personal communication, Lahore, July 15, 2008). Former Human Rights Commission of Pakistan head I. A. Rahman thought that the media was a major factor in encouraging violence in Pakistan.

### ***Political Culture***

The largely undemocratic political culture<sup>3</sup> of Pakistan is primarily responsible for the radicalization of the populace. While everyone has equal access to political opportunities under the

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<sup>3</sup> Sidney Verba writes that political culture "consists of a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the situation in which political action takes place." (Cited in Qureshi, 2002, p. 3).

Constitution and the law, in practice, this is not the case. Political rights are denied to certain social classes. Some of the groups and regions have so deeply ingrained feelings of political deprivation that it has pushed individuals to the point of using force. By using violence, they hope to lessen or completely eradicate their political deprivation. Thus, radicalization among the deprived is directly caused by our uneven political culture. One might see the tribal areas as an illustration.

As stated by Siddique Qureshi, a political culture of conflict has been fostered by a number of variables (Qureshi 2002, ix). Thus, violence, intolerance, and authoritarianism prevail in a state of flux that characterizes our political culture (Qureshi 2002: 4).

Political problems have plagued the nation throughout its history. Another crisis is brewing before the current one ends. This politically unstable culture has severely impacted the ability of communities to coexist in peace and harmony. The majority of the populace has little faith in political elites and institutions. Any argument for using drastic measures has merit in this situation. A situation like this makes radicalism easy to thrive.

### ***Economic Culture***

Pakistan's economic culture, which includes deprivation and a lack of chances for the youth, has helped the process of radicalization. A number of the economic standards and principles are antiquated and incongruous with contemporary economic conditions. A large portion of Pakistanis disagree with the idea of working hard to achieve financial success. Some interpret it as materialistic. Many people look for divine help in improving their circumstances. Economic inequities have gotten worse as a result. Worlds separate the rich, middle class, and poor classes. The middle class is caught in the middle, with the impoverished facing extreme hardship. Numerous members of the middle class have dropped below the poverty threshold in successive waves. Many observers note that while the poor are getting poorer, the wealthiest are getting richer. Under such circumstances, extreme ideologies serve as a cure-all for people who have given up on improving their financial situation.

### ***Religious Culture***

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the religious revolution in Iran in 1979, radicalism began to spread dramatically in Pakistan. The majority of the Mujahideen, who arrived from various countries to wage jihad against the USSR, went through or stayed in Pakistan. Many made Pakistan their permanent home. They were mostly responsible for local groups becoming radicalized. The consequences of events in Afghanistan have affected people living along the Pakistan-Afghan border throughout history (Shinwari 2013: 2). Moreover, the Zia government reacted disproportionately due to pressure from some of the allied Middle Eastern powers, especially Saudi Arabia, as a result of the enthusiasm among Shi'ites in Pakistan following the Shi'ite revolution in Iran. As a result, extremist Sunni organizations that attacked Shi'ites came to be. Radical Shi'ite organizations also emerged in response to avenge the attacks. Shia-Sunni violence consequently got ingrained in Pakistan's religious tradition.

### ***Desire for Martyrdom***

*Shaheed ki jo maut hey wo qaum ki hayat hey* is one of Pakistan's most well-known poems by national poet Muhammad Iqbal. It means, "The death of a martyr is a nation's life." Nonstate actors

commonly utilize poetry and teachings that exalt martyrs to incite young people to carry out violent acts. The thought of becoming a martyr inspires a lot of young people. However, the question is: How similar—if at all—is their conception of martyrdom to Iqbal's? Their conception of martyrdom is, for the most part, shaped by radical organizations. These indoctrinations are the outcome of official efforts to cultivate a jihadi culture for specific objectives, such as battling the Soviet Union. Jihadi sermons and songs became a normal thing during and after the Afghan jihad. Per Fair's survey study, 44% of the jihadis were recruited through religious gatherings, and 42% through friends or family (Fair 2008: 59). Suicide attacks are also carried out by radicals. In Saif's view, there are cultural and societal traditions that condone suicide and associate it with martyrdom (A. Saif, personal communication, November 12, 2008).

### ***Tilt in the Religious Culture***

Religious culture has leaned towards violence and intolerance to some extent. Petty politics, driven in part by financial considerations, persist in this culture. Forcibly taking over mosques is a widespread occurrence. Mosques owned by members of different sects are seized by members of other groups. Many preachers typically propagate only a piece of Islamic doctrine to foster a particular kind of religious community that supports and protects their own financial and personal interests. This kind of culture was established and is being reinforced by a segment of the religious elite. People are often sentimentalized through the use of religion as a socialization tool. It may be said that the attempts to Islamize the country warped culture to the point where radical beliefs and practices gained some traction. Despite being called "Islamic," Pakistan's religious culture is largely un-Islamic when it comes to humanitarian values.

### ***Folk Culture: Anti-Thesis of Radicalism***

One could interpret Pakistani folk culture as the antithesis of radicalism. Radicalism does not appear to fit in there. Love and peace are prevalent themes in almost all forms of folk literature. Folklore study is a social peace technique that can support de-radicalization initiatives. A society's ideals and beliefs are reflected in its folklore. It is a societal "aesthetic product" (Sabeeha 1991: 269). Sabeeha has advocated for the inclusion of folklore as a stand-alone subject in school curricula. She assumes that studying folklore will increase younger people's identification with their indigenous heritage and help close the generational divide (Sabeeha 1991: 268). Elderly and younger people connect when studying folklore. She goes on to say that the elderly people are familiar with folklore and can recite proverbs, riddles, stories about magic, sagas, and similar tales. The younger generation will have a better understanding of the thoughts, emotions, and behaviors of the elderly. As a first step towards closing the generational divide, this would facilitate communication between the younger and older generations (Sabeeha 1991: 269).

People are readily affected; they are impressionable. Culturally adaptive individuals might go in both positive and negative directions. The former aims to contribute or accomplish particular objectives in a nonviolent manner. On the other hand, the latter employs force to further their goal. The person becomes a peaceful citizen if the link between culture and personality is beneficial; if not, they become aggressive citizens who join the ranks of radicals. The degree of aggression might change depending on the situation.

### **Cultural Challenges or Issues**

In addition to the above-discussed five cultural dimensions, the following seven cultural issues or challenges—aversion to performing arts, feeling of dis-ownership, resistance to national culture and monoculture, conspiracy theories, acculturation, and material and reflexive norms—are also relevant in order to have an insight into the subject (Figure 2).

#### ***Sense of Dis-Ownership***

The public's expectations have not been fulfilled by the governments in power thus far in terms of service delivery. Gas and electricity load shedding is a persistent problem. In Pakistani society, opposing the government is regarded as a daring and courageous deed. Stated differently, there is a social value associated with engaging in radical operations against security forces. The radicals who attack state employees are especially appreciated by those who suffer at the hands of state institutions.

#### ***Dislike for Recreation***

Many people find that there are not enough opportunities or facilities for recreation because of societal repression and a lack of finances. The majority of people reside in areas where leisure is practically nonexistent. Even in cities, there are not enough recreational opportunities. The vast majority cannot afford to visit the leisure locations that are offered. Furthermore, since it is viewed as a luxury and waste, spending money on cultural and recreational activities is typically disliked and discouraged. In the erstwhile FATA and other regions of the nation, a lot of people think that playing sports is bad (Shinwari 2013: 3).

Joining a radical group also provides opportunities that are on par with leisure options. Traveling within the country and abroad excites the young people who are tired of their life's monotony and dullness, whether they are working at factories and stores or with their parents, who are farmers and artisans.

#### ***Avoidance of Performing Arts***

A society in which cultural expressions such as singing and dancing are frowned upon will turn radical (Q. Javed, personal communication, November 20, 2008). These kinds of actions are all viewed as wicked and indicative of waywardness. Qazi Javed thinks that Pakistanis have the wrong idea of what a "human being" is; they fail to understand the importance of cultural pursuits in addition to other facets of a person's existence.

#### ***Resistance Against the Monoculture and National Culture***

Many Pakistanis believe that globalization leads to the emergence of a "monoculture" at the expense of local and national culture (Ahmed, 2006). The radicals do declare their intention to oppose the monoculture, claiming that Western cultural ideals have a strong influence on it. For this reason, there are significant international connections to the radicalization process in Pakistan. The radicals think that their cultural and religious values are being attacked.

In Pakistan, the state is dedicated to advancing a national culture. For some Pakistanis, it feels like an assault on their subcultures. Consequently, the national culture is somewhat in competition with subcultures or provincial cultures. Some believe that the most contentious aspect of Pakistani


concepts has been its national culture (Qadeer 2006: 61). Ahmed has correctly noted that the state's intentions about the identity of its citizens have an impact on culture. In order to distinguish its citizens from those of a bordering "enemy" state, the state may alter popular culture (Ahmed, 2006).

### ***Conspiracy Theories, Stereotypes, and the Global Society***

In Pakistan, a lot of people trust conspiracy theories. Numerous issues facing the country are thought to be caused by foreign governments. It is believed that the aforementioned states are complicit in plots against Pakistan and other Muslim countries. Anger towards the states deemed adversaries stems from these beliefs and emotions. The perception that the majority of Pakistani governments are merely Western "puppets" exacerbates resentment towards the country's ruling class. Such resentment and rage encourage young people's radical tendencies.

Blame-others syndrome can occasionally be caused by perceptions and misperceptions. Pakistani society has a strong hold on the syndrome (Qadeer 2006: 250). Many Pakistanis hold an unfavorable view of both internal and foreign politics due to the highly structured conceptions of politics and the world, especially the West. Numerous people have been drawn towards radical groups by these perceptions—both domestic and foreign.

**Figure 2:** Cultural challenges



### **Acculturation**

Acculturation refers to the phenomena that arise from constant first-hand interaction between individuals from different cultures, leading to eventual modifications in either or both groups' original cultural patterns (Berry, 1980). A portion of the youth population in Pakistan has adopted radical beliefs and practices from abroad. Pakistani culture has absorbed traits from other civilizations, the most obvious example being Afghanistan, where people have been engaged in protracted civil or international wars. There may also be mention of some Middle Eastern states.

### ***Material and Reflexive Norms***

In addition to actively promoting self-regulation and self-education within social systems, reflexive norms should work to mitigate any unfavorable exterior consequences they may have through compensatory adjustments. Reflexive norms aim to promote conformity by means of self-

engagement—the understanding of the validity of rules—as opposed to external engagement, which is the imposition of constraints through control and punishment (Carter 2007: 92). Conventions and etiquette guidelines are instances of reflexive norms (Burge 2010: 314, n. 36). A society or an individual can achieve peace through the development and application of suitable reflective norms. In Pakistani society, three fundamental institutions are involved in instilling these norms: education, media, and mosques. For this reason, the literacy rate needs to rise. The primary reason Pakistan's education system is of poor quality is that it does not prioritize creating mature and responsible people. In general, it does not teach critical thinking or logical reasoning. Many university graduates are among the radicals, suggesting that university education leaves enough mental room for the graduates to be drawn to radical beliefs.

## **CONCLUSION**

The analysis focuses on seven cultural issues or challenges, including distaste for recreation, avoiding the performing arts, feeling of dis-ownership, resistance against national culture and monoculture, conspiracy theories, acculturation, and material and reflexive norms. The five cultural dimensions discussed are educational, media, political, economic, and folk. The majority of Pakistanis do not use violence to further their political agendas, indicating that most aspects of their culture are peaceful. Relatively, very few Pakistanis use violence motivated by politics or sectarianism. It implies that radicalization may result from a variety of factors, not only culture. Some of the elements of Pakistani culture, however, contribute to radicalization in Pakistan. The three main cultural factors are the highly skewed educational culture, the divisive and sectarian religious culture, and the economically driven society that upholds blatant inequality.

One more factor is an authoritarian culture. The undemocratic political culture of Pakistan is primarily responsible for the radicalization of the populace. A political culture of conflict has been fostered by several variables. Pakistan's economic culture, which includes deprivation and a lack of chances for the youth, has helped the process of radicalization.

The school system in Pakistan has not been able to adequately instill in the populace the kind of cultural values that are desired for a peaceful existence. It is customary for public schools and madrassahs to use corporal punishment on their students. The social sciences are crucial in promoting moderate attitudes and behaviors as well as moderate practices and ideals. Nonetheless, the government and community in Pakistan have not given social sciences enough emphasis. One could interpret Pakistani folk culture as the antithesis of radicalism. Love and peace are prevalent themes in almost all forms of folk literature. But it is widely ignored in the national syllabi. One of the most effective instruments for controlling the socialization process is the media. It gives such information that encourages viewers and readers to regard radicals with sympathy. Religious culture has leaned towards violence and intolerance.

Many people find that there are not enough opportunities or facilities for recreation because of societal repression and a lack of finances. Joining a radical group also provides opportunities that are on par with leisure options. Moreover, a society in which cultural expressions such as singing and dancing are frowned upon will turn radical. In addition, in Pakistani society, opposing the government is regarded as a daring and courageous deed. A lot of people trust conspiracy theories.

Numerous issues facing the country are thought to be caused by the governments of the United States, Israel, India, and other Western nations.

Globalization, many Pakistanis think, attacks local cultures and thus deprives societies of their ability to remain tied to traditional roots, leading to the emergence of a “monoculture”. On the other hand, Pakistani culture has also absorbed traits from other civilizations, the most obvious example being Afghanistan, where people have been engaged in protracted civil or international wars.

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