



**Generational Model of Warfare and Evolution of Hybrid Warfare:
A Review of Diverse Perspectives**

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Abstract:

This paper aims to explain the generational model of warfare and to elaborate theory of Hybrid Warfare. The paper endeavours to clarify the conceptual understanding of Hybrid Warfare by evaluating the perspectives from different parts of the world. The dynamics of war have changed with the passage of time and the war in contemporary times has taken a different form where conventional and irregular forces are visible on the same battlefronts. The international strategic landscape has transformed in the aftermath of the cold war as the emerging actors and strategies cannot be placed under the existing categories because they do not follow the existing models of warfare. The defence analysts and academics theorise the emergence of a different and innovative type of warfare called Hybrid warfare. Hybrid Warfare has diverse and multifaceted perspectives around the world. A comprehensive understanding of the generational model of warfare and conceptual clarity about our understanding of the changing nature of warfare is a prerequisite to counter contemporary challenges.

Keywords: Hybrid Warfare, Generational Model of Warfare, Instruments of Power, Non-Kinetic warfare, Identity Conflicts

INTRODUCTION

Although peace can be the intrinsic aspiration of humanity, the clash is rooted in the structure of states and the international state system. War has often been studied as political and social phenomena through the prism of military application. From the onset of human history, war and warfare have undergone numerous changes owing to the continuous evolution of science and technology. Carl von Clausewitz, famous Prussian military philosopher, writes, "War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case." Clausewitz further argues that hatred and violence, chance and probability, and political deliberations are three fundamental elements of war. These elements are being altered and manipulated by the interaction of people, military forces and governments (Paret, Howard, & Brodie, 1976, p.89). These components are not new; instead, they are constituents of all recorded conflicts since ancient times. The pattern of conflicts and the way of governance changed significantly after the culmination of World War II.

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The existence of these changes was seen due to the rise in power of Non-State Actors (NSAs) in contrast to the overall power of the state. The other significant impact was felt due to the emergence of geo-economics which became the cornerstone for state relationships. The changes in state relationships, owing to geo-economics, significantly reduced the probability for states to employ military or kinetic means. Consequently, the non-kinetic dimensions have gained ascendancy and prominence, thus changing the nature and characteristics of warfare.

The dynamics of war have changed with the passage of time and the war in contemporary times has taken a different form where conventional and irregular forces are visible on the same battlefronts. The defence analysts and academics theorise the emergence of a different and innovative type of warfare called Hybrid warfare. This phrase has gotten momentum, especially over the last decade. The intensive research in the domain of military affairs has primarily reshaped the character of modern warfare over the last couple of years. Many scholars and analysts observed the salient characteristics of contemporary conflicts which differ from the previous conflicts. These observations lead to the conception of new terminologies and approaches, such as 'postmodern wars', 'peoples wars', 'new wars', 'wars of the third kind', 'privatized wars' or 'hybrid wars'; while the opponents argued that these characteristics of warfare are present since ancient times (Malantowicz, 2013). Nevertheless, Clausewitz said that the nature of war might change depending upon the environment where it is fought, but war is war no matter how it is fought. Hybrid warfare is employed by adversaries in different domains to extend war beyond the physical domain into a broad spectrum of actions in time and space to pursue their interests and objectives. Time plays a vital role in case of Hybrid warfare which poses a significant challenge for armed forces engaged against a Hybrid adversary. T. E. Lawrence once argued the same while he talked about the Arab Spring after World War-I, "Final victory seemed certain if the war lasted long enough for us to work it out" (Longbine 2008, 40).

Hybrid threats are not novel. Although the strategies of waging Hybrid warfare have transformed over time, the basic rule of innovative strategies by blending the facets of regular and irregular warfare remains the same to achieve the national interest. This combination has significant illustrations in the Napoleonic Wars where British conventional forces confronted the French occupation of major Spanish cities where Spanish guerrillas also played an important role. Additionally, the American Revolution with George Washington's Continental Army and vigorous paramilitaries and the Arab Revolt where the British Army combined conventional operations in Palestine with irregular forces under British operational control (Hoffman, 2007, p.20). Although, the fundamental principles of Hybrid warfare evolved from the history yet the contemporary hybrid conflicts have the ability to transform the entire spectrum of strategic calculations of adversaries owing to evolution in the field of technology and communication, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and the sudden rise of non-state actors at the international stage (Alex, 2015).

GENERATIONAL MODEL OF WARFARE

Azad and Haider (2020) argue that the tactics of warfare are rapidly changing from the row and column strategies of 1st generation warfare to the neither black nor white strategies of hybrid or 5th generation warfare. The international strategic landscape has transformed in the aftermath of the cold war as the emerging actors and strategies cannot be placed under the existing categories

because they do not follow the existing models of warfare. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Ukraine and Kashmir are the classic examples of Hybrid warfare where strategies like blending of conventional competencies, irregular campaigns, information operations and terrorism have been employed to achieve desired objectives. The rise of Islamic State (IS) and the ensuing acts of violence and terrorism itself are examples of hybrid warfare. Hybrid Warfare poses a threat to global peace and security and the state. The transformations in the nature of conflicts along disproportionate domains constitute a problematic choice between counterinsurgency and conventional strategies and deviate from the traditional concepts of war and peace.

The dynamics of the generational model of warfare can be explained in relation to its impact on the states. The nature of Warfare has been persistently progressing and changing for centuries. It is a continually shifting paradigm that leaves policymakers and military persons in a never-ending state of preparedness and advancement (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999). The common thread of the generational model is the development of a new generation from the preceding generation driven through the mainframe instrument of technological revolutions. The emergence of generations of Warfare dates back to the end of Thirty Years War with the imposition of Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the emergence of the modern state system (Somkuti & Kiss, 2009, p.263). The boundaries between generations of warfare are not clearly defined, and an overlap generally exists between the generations (Somkuti & Kiss, 2009, p.264).

William Lind and Thomas Hammes are the earlier proponents of the generational model of warfare as they proposed the Fourth Generation Warfare in 1989. The author argued that “whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to a catastrophic defeat.” The article laid down the foundation of the concept that conventional interstate warfare would lessen substantially while low-intensity conflicts, terrorism, guerrilla warfare and insurgencies would flourish in times to come. As the originator of the “*Generational warfare*” framework, Lind described generation as shorthand for a dialectically qualitative shift (Lind, Keith, Schmitt, & Gary, 1989). More straightforwardly, if the difference in sizes is not profoundly huge, an army from an older generation of warfare cannot defeat a force from a newer one.

The theory of generational model emerged when issues like the disintegration of the USSR and fall of the Berlin Wall marred the international milieu. They defined the first three generations with their relative weaponry and political structures of states adapting to those forms of warfare. After that, they proposed the fourth generation of warfare to explain the contemporary conflicts of that time which were not covered under the first three generations of warfare to explain that the nature and character of war were changing.

Concept and Dynamics of Hybrid Warfare

The Hybrid warfare concept is the most debated topic over the past few years for multiple fields including military, academia and military literature. The debate generally revolves around the concept of hybrid warfare, methods to be employed, technologies to be developed and actors to be countered. All these aspects make the understanding of hybrid warfare a very complex subject. The Western militaries have mainly focussed on this subject to counter the potential adversaries in hybrid warfare domain. “The origins of the hybrid discussion can be traced back through many of

the concepts spawned in the period after the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War. For example, in recent years the terms Compound War, 'Hybrid,' 4th Generation war, 5th Generation war, '3-Block War,' Traditional Warfare,' and others have been used to describe everything from the strategic to the tactical level military environment, often in such a manner that confuses threat, adversary, and the levels of warfare" (Chuka & Born, 2014, p.3). The involvement of an ever-increasing number of non-state actors along with the availability of latest technologies have reshaped the nature of latest conflicts which are called "Hybrid threats", and the occasions involving such threats are called Hybrid Warfare (Hoffman, 2007, p.5).

Hybrid Warfare

The first step is to understand definition, evolution, methods and means of hybrid warfare to develop conceptual understanding of the term. The rapid advancements in the fields of technology and communications have affected all spheres of human life. The means of communication, transportation and information exchange have brought revolution over previous decades. Leaving other domains aside, the significant impact of these advancements has been observed on the warfare and changing nature of conflicts. As one nation develops a new technology, the others try to develop and innovate further to stay at par. This impulsive development of technologies gives rise to unending competition in the field of warfare and warfighting. Owing to these competitions, many forms of warfare have been developed including but not restricted to Electronic Warfare, Information Warfare, Cyber Warfare, Space Warfare, Media Warfare, Social Media Warfare, Economic Warfare, Terrorism and so on. Post truth politics and digital transformation has comprehensively changed the global politics (Azad, 2019, p.11). As a manifestation of these developments, an ambiguous and uncertain form of warfare emerged which is termed as Hybrid Warfare or Fifth Generation Warfare. The phrase 'Hybrid Warfare' was coined in 2002, but it got special attention in 2014 as the defence, academia and policy circles in west regarded Crimean annexation by Russian as an act of Hybrid warfare (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017, p.1). The Western defence analysts and policymakers raised their concerns on Russian Hybrid warfare (Radin, 2017, p.1).

The term "hybrid warfare" is used in different ways by different people depending upon their understanding and comprehension of the subject. Several related terms are now in use, including grey zone strategies, competition short of conflict, active measures and "new generation warfare" (Chuka & Born, 2014, p.3). Despite certain dissimilarities, all these terms point to the same thing: using multiple instruments of power and influence, with an emphasis on non-military tools, to pursue national interests outside borders. Modern hybrid warfare is about old approaches and practices suitably tailored to mesh with the development of technology and information tools which conveniently conceal the actual originator of the onslaught (M. W. Haider, Azad, & Ahmad, 2020).

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON HYBRID WARFARE

At present, no universally agreed-upon definition exists for Hybrid Warfare. It is agreed upon by the international community that the problem of Hybrid warfare exists but no one clearly understands. So it is essential to have a common and clear understanding of the concept of Hybrid warfare to reach a viable solution. The first step is to institute a baseline understanding of hybrid warfare

centered on the latest literature and empirical evidence. This baseline understanding will clear up conceptual confusion regarding hybrid warfare and will establish a common language for describing the concept. In fact, such wars are not a new phenomenon; however, the term “Hybrid War” was first coined by Frank G Hoffman after the Israel – Lebanon War in 2006. Hoffman (2007) defines it as “Simultaneous employment of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour at the same time and battle-space to obtain political objectives” (p.58). We can first review few Contemporary perspectives of Hybrid Warfare prevailing in different countries.

US Perspective

Many other scholars and military men followed the lead of Hoffman and defined hybrid warfare from the United States’ perspective according to their understanding of contemporary issues. After the Lebanon war, Hoffman defined the Hybrid threat as, “Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behaviour in the battlespace to obtain their political objectives” (Gunneriusson, 2012, p.48). This definition dwells upon the asymmetric conflict where non-state actors employ a mix of non-traditional methods to gain an advantage against a superior adversary. The 2015 edition of Military Balance provides a very comprehensive definition and states that “the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign, designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure”(“Complex crises call for adaptable and durable capabilities,” 2015, p.5). This definition is very complicated as it blends multiple areas, including both military and non-military aspects. William Nemeth defines it as “Hybrid Warfare blends the conventional and unconventional resources to formulate a holistic brand of waging war by employing multiple means in a hybrid threat environment towards achieving de-stabilization of the target state”. The United States strategy revolves around getting an advantage in both physical as well as cognitive domain.

General James Mattis, Commander of US Central Command defines Hybrid Warfare as “Irregular challengers seek to exploit tactical advantages at a time and place of their own choosing, rather than playing by our rules. They seek to accumulate a series of small tactical effects, magnify them through the media and by information warfare, to weaken the resolve of the targeted nation-state. This unprecedented synthesis is what we call Hybrid Warfare”. Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud define it as “Hybrid warfare is asymmetric and uses multiple instruments of power along a horizontal and vertical axis, and to varying degrees shares an increased emphasis on creativity, ambiguity, and the cognitive elements of war” (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017, p.3). A NATO Parliamentary Assembly publication defined hybrid threats as “the use of asymmetrical tactics to probe for and exploit domestic weaknesses via non-military means, backed by the threat of conventional military means” (Calha, 2015, p.3). The United States perceived that Russians might employ conventional or nuclear threats to safeguard their non-conventional activities in areas of interest and may legitimize her actions by media warfare (Radin, 2017, p.5). The scholars viewed that the United States and her allies need to have a clear understanding of Hybrid warfare to thwart the challenges posed by Russian Hybrid Warfare.

Bachmann and Gunneriusson noted that hybrid threat is a much broader term which comprises a wide range of difficult situations and incidents including ethnic conflict, terrorism, migration and piracy which are being faced by NATO. The challenge is to adopt new strategies or combinations of strategies to achieve political objectives by countering these threats (Bachmann, 2015, p.79). In this definition, authors have included migration and piracy into the category of hybrid threats which is debatable but not novel. John defines the Hybrid warfare as “full-spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community” (McCuen, 2008, p.108). This definition can be applied to explain various scenarios, but the problem lies with the identification of combat zones, and home front as the very nature of Hybrid Warfare is that the boundaries between peace and war are not distinct.

Russian Perspective

Russian analysts described Hybrid warfare concept as “New Generation Warfare” or “Non-linear War.” The US and NATO regard the Georgian War (2008) and the Crimean Conflict (2014) as the manifestation of the Russian approach to Hybrid Warfare but from the Russian perspective, these were strategic protective operations to counter US hybrid threat against its national interests and tenets (Wither, 2016). The Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov gave this idea on the changing nature of war based on his analysis from the Arab Spring and Colour revolutions and pointed out that the nature of conflicts is being reshaped owing to the employment of non-traditional methods of waging war. Gerasimov also highlighted that many countries widely utilise covert military operations supplemented by political confrontations (Gerasimov, 2013). He highlighted the requirements to maintain the control of territory and population from the attacks of enemy information warfare and special operations and termed this concept as a territorial defence. The Western thinkers believe that the Russian understanding of Hybrid warfare is based on the Gerasimov Doctrine.

The United States and NATO regard the Georgian War (2008) and the Crimean Conflict (2014) as the manifestation of the Russian approach to Hybrid Warfare, but from the Russian perspective, these wars were its endeavours to protect its national; interests from the Hybrid threats from the United States (Wither, 2016, p.86). Andrew Korybko, a Russian describes this concept as “Hybrid Warfare are externally provoked identity conflicts, which exploit historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic and geographical differences within geostrategic transit states through the phased transition from Colour Revolution to Unconventional Wars to disrupt, control, influence, multipolar transnational connective infrastructure by means of Regime Tweaking, Regime Change and / or Regime Reboot” (Korybko, 2017, p.207). András Rácz noted that in Russian military thinking the concept of hybrid warfare is constructed on the assimilation of military and non-military sources to achieve an integrated effect (Kumar, 2017, p.61). As viewed by the United States, the Russian employ. Hybrid Warfare by a blend of information operations, Cyberwarfare, clandestine operations, proxies, economic and political influences. These elements are applied separately or blended in different combinations to achieve the desired objectives.

Russian Emphasis remains that the United States is employing Hybrid Warfare against Russia as well as many other states (Khan, 2018, p.31). Andrew Korybko's understanding of Hybrid Warfare

revolves around the idea of regime changeover by exploiting the fault lines of the society specially ethnic, religious and cultural differences. Furthermore, this concept is based on an in- to -out approach where society is degraded from core to the perimeter. He views that Russia and China are being exposed to Hybrid Warfare owing to their economic growth and initiatives like Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, he claims that Pakistan will also be subjected to Hybrid Warfare owing to its geo-strategic location (Khan, 2018, p.32). The Western understanding of Russian hybrid warfare is based on the perception of employment through proxies to create fog, uncertainty and threat of employment of conventional forces (Monaghan, 2015, p.66). The Russian's strategy remains to exploit the weaknesses of the adversary indirectly instead of engaging directly into a conventional conflict and they followed the same in annexation of Crimea. They employ conventional forces and irregulars supplemented by diplomatic, media and information operations to achieve desired political outcomes. Russians also have a notion that they need to be proactive in the Hybrid domain as the cyber threats are increasing but Russian technological capability is not comparable to western technologies so they adopt proactive measures to ensure security against Cyber threats.

Indian Perspective

The Indian perspective is significant as it has a direct bearing on Pakistan's understanding of hybrid threats. The narrative which India portrays to the world implies that Pakistan is employing Hybrid warfare tactics against India. Brig (R) Anil Gupta, of Indian Army in his article in Indian Defence Review defines it as "Hybrid war can best be described as a combination of conventional and sub-conventional threats and can be unleashed both by the state and non-state actors" (Gupta, 2016). He even claimed that Pakistan is employing Hybrid Warfare against India since the partition in 1947 and few high-class Indians are supporting Pakistan in waging Hybrid wars against India (Khan, 2018, p.32). Now by analysing this, we see that the claim is self-refuting as at that time the world was transitioning from Third Generation to Fourth-generation warfare while the concept of Hybrid Warfare emerged in the early 2000s. The Indian concept revolves around conventional warfare, irregular warfare, economic warfare, media warfare, special operations and information warfare aspects of Hybridity. Dhankhar (2017) noted that in Hybrid Wars, the weapons and missiles of a failed state might fall in the hands of non-state actors who may utilise those weapons in non-traditional ways to attack India in different domains. Dhankhar's (2017) definition is mainly based on the perception of a failed state where non-state actors take over the control of weapons of mass destruction and attack India. Indians try to build a perception about Pakistan being a rogue state whose weapons can be acquired by terrorists to attack India. The basic premise over here is to malign the image of Pakistan to show the international community that the Pakistan Nuclear program is not safe. India has been doing such propaganda in the past as well.

Narender Kumar defines Hybrid warfare as, "Hybrid war is on the cusp of conventional and sub-conventional wars and exploits regular and irregular capabilities to achieve the desired results — that of fighting a war against a strong nation without the risk of major retribution. The manifestation of hybrid threat can break the barrier of 'no peace no war' to a war-like situation" (Kumar, 2017, p.60). This definition puts the Hybrid Warfare between conventional and sub-conventional wars where a nation employs a mix of regular and irregular tactics to fight against a powerful adversary with the fewer chances of significant retaliation. Kumar has not taken into account that even stronger nations may employ the Hybrid Warfare against weak nations which he

has discussed in the same paper where the United States employed Hybrid Warfare for regime change in Libya and Russian Hybrid warfare in Ukraine. He further highlights that the Hybrid Warfare manifestations will be enlarged with the increased Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean (Kumar, 2017, p.59). Kumar also highlights that Pakistan has mastered the art of integrated employment of conventional and irregulars along with the integration of non-state actors which can be observed in Kashmir. Therefore, India needs to have a clear understanding of Hybrid warfare to counter the threats posed by Pakistan and China. Indian approach focuses on the Kashmir conflict where India claims that Pakistan has been sponsoring non-state actors to fight against India while giving the pretext of just cause (Kumar, 2017, p.64). The Indian perspective on Hybrid warfare rests on its threat perception based on Pakistan, China and launching of CPEC, which is considered a 'Game-Changer' in the region. India also considers the freedom struggle of the Kashmiris as hybrid warfare sponsored by Pakistan and this argument is quite evident in the existing literature by Indian scholars and military thinkers.

Pakistani Perspective

The Pakistani perspective on Hybrid warfare is a reflection or response of the Indian perspective. Pakistan claims that India is waging Hybrid wars against Pakistan to destabilise and balkanise Pakistan by employing all the instruments of power and policy in a coordinated yet concealed manner. From the Pakistani perspective, the Indian policy of Hybrid warfare encompasses the state-sponsored terrorism, media and cultural invasion and diplomatic strategies to malign the image of Pakistan in order to get it isolated from the international community (Khan, 2018, p.32). Raashid Wali Janjua defines 5th Generation Warfare as, "Fifth-generation warfare is an interesting development, where non-state warriors fight nation-states out of sheer frustration without clear political objectives" (Wali Janjua, 2019). This definition focuses on the involvement of non-state actors who fight against the state, but the objectives of these actors are not laid down. Anum Sheikh defines Hybrid Warfare as, "Hybrid warfare is a form of fourth-generation warfare that is more decentralized, fluid and asymmetrical in nature. One can say that hybrid warfare is an excellent tactic that is designed to target an adversary's opportunity of growth without waging a real war" (Sheikh, 2017). She has conceptualised Hybrid warfare as a form of fourth-generation warfare which is not a correct approach as it is widely accepted that Hybrid warfare is Fifth generation warfare. She notes that hybrid warfare is a more decentralised form of warfare where the enemy's growth potential is targeted covertly without waging the overt war, and one side generally has an advantage. This definition is similar to the United States' understanding of Russian Hybrid warfare. The dynamics of Hybrid warfare in Pakistan can be termed as unique as Pakistan has been subjected to multiple instruments of hybrid warfare waged by a diverse range of actors (M. Haider & Azad, 2020).

MULTINATIONAL CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN (MCDC) COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE PROJECT, "UNDERSTANDING HYBRID WARFARE"


Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, "Understanding Hybrid Warfare" aimed to give a conceptual understanding of challenges associated with hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare is widely prevailed and is equally employed by both the state and non-state actors. The challenges posed by hybrid Warfare are expected to expand in future, which necessitates the understanding of the problem to counter it effectively. The ways and means

being employed by state and non-state actors to employ hybrid Warfare are at opposite ends of the spectrum, yet both manifest the capabilities to orchestrate numerous devices of power. Multinational Capability Development Campaign describes hybrid warfare as “the synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effect” (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017, 3). Hybrid warfare is designed to exploit national vulnerabilities across the political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructural (PMESII) spectrum. Therefore, as a minimum, national governments should conduct a self-assessment of critical functions and vulnerabilities across all sectors, and maintain it regularly (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017, 11).

Figure 1 below depicts PMESSI (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017, 14). Attacking in any one domain affects different orders in other domains as well which can create a crisis or emergency in the same domain or some different domain. It implies that all the domains are interlinked through a complex mechanism.

Figure 1: PMESSI.

Visualizing hybrid warfare using the Analytical Framework



A hybrid warfare actor can synchronize its military, political, economic, civilian, informational (MPECI) instruments of power to vertically and horizontally escalate a series of specific activities to create effects. It can either vertically escalate by increasing the intensity of one or many of the instruments of power, and/or horizontally ‘escalate’ through synchronizing multiple instruments of power to create effects higher than vertical escalation alone (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017, p.9). Figure 2 below depicts this (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017, 9).

Proposed Definition

Considering the above definitions, it can be assumed that hybrid wars are primarily the contextual wars, in which wars are designed and waged depending on the contexts and vulnerabilities. The case of Pakistan is unique from other hybrid conflicts as it is a nuclear power which has an


enduring rivalry with neighbouring India and is targeted by multiple state and non-state actors. This paper defines Hybrid warfare in the Pakistani context as, “A victim driven warfare, waged to accentuate and create vulnerabilities in a synchronized manner through multi-layered and multidimensional attack packages across the political, military, economic, social, media and diplomatic spectrum, leading to unmanageable crisis; eventually leading to behavioural change and submission of target below defined thresholds to abdicate its legitimate interests.”

SALIENT ASPECTS OF HYBRID WARFARE

Based upon the definitions and perspectives of this unique form of warfare, salient aspects of Hybrid Warfare have been drawn which are being explained in the ensuing paragraphs.

Blurred Lines. In a globalized community, where things are becoming interdependent very rapidly, boundaries blur while limits become relative. In the context of Hybrid Warfare, the lines between war and peace have gradually blurred, which makes the demarcation of boundaries a problematic proposition. The non-state actors merge with the civil populations, which makes distinction almost impossible. The internal security situation of Pakistan is a classical manifestation of blurred lines where anti-state elements are waging hybrid wars through various means.

Ability to Achieve Supra-Combinations. The ability to form supra-combinations renders Hybrid Warfare combatants possess the capability to form Supra-Combinations to achieve advantages that are much beyond the boundaries of conventional war. Now a days both state and non-state actors have the capability to contest in supra combinations which allow them to use numerous ways for



rendering an adversaries efforts futile or irrelevant. Some of these combinations are:

1. **Supra - Domain.** The expanse of conflict has spanned to embrace the physical, cognitive, information, political and social domains into its confines. War is no longer confined to armed rivals only but has moved on to embrace “all aspects of human experience” (Cebrowski, 2005). This essentially means that now the opponents have the ability to contest each other over battlefields set throughout the entire gamut of human life, for example; cultural warfare, sanctions and financial pressure, market denial, media and psychological warfare, religious

and sectarian divide and technological warfare. Technological advancements have made media a tool of waging warfare in various domains.

2. **Supra - Adversary.** The concept of supra-adversary has surpassed the old-fashioned idea of the nation-state. An Adversary may now include a singular entity or joint organizations like NATO, non-state actors, network(s), and or super-empowered individuals, criminal groups. Information and communication revolution has created interlinked and interconnected communities that have never been imagined. With the regional and global outreach through the internet, these communities can rally up supra-adversary combinations with potentials to compete at par nation-states. Islamic State (IS), Tehreek-e-Taliban, Al-Qaeda are few of the manifestations of Supra-adversary.

3. **Supra - Objective.** The accomplishment of the objective in the context of Hybrid Warfare is not aimed at destroying or defeating an adversary in conventional domains as it used to be in the earlier generations of warfare (STAFF, 2017). Objectives may vary from the acquisition of small info to very complex processes of hunting shadows. Hybrid warfare adversaries may employ diverse strategies to achieve objectives in multiple domains.

4. **Supra - Force.** Force in any form or shape whether kinetic or non-kinetic, linear or nonlinear can be effectively employed to bring down an opponent. Although the military would be the dominant form of the kinetic force, the non-kinetic force could shape itself in any number. "Non-kinetic sources of force that may be combined may include political, economic, social or cultural, media fabrication, information control, and technology and resource denial, legal, physiological, religious or any other measures taken to defeat an adversary" (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999, p.XII).

Combinations of Combinations. An opponent's ability to achieve combinations through manipulation of the realms of war enables him to achieve unmatched flexibility and agility by overcoming the limitations of the resources and multiplying capability to unbelievable proportions. Unlike conventional warfare where time tested strategies are employed to achieve political aims, hybrid warfare actors may employ a wide range of combinations of different instruments of Hybrid Warfare for achieving desired effects.

CHARACTERISTICS OF HYBRID WARFARE


Hybrid Warfare is a progression of fourth-generation warfare ("Fifth Generation Warfare Features," 2010). Its characteristics are:

1. The obsolescence of the traditional military and its traditional hardware (Hammes, 2006, p.156).
2. In third or fourth generation warfare, one could not hack enemy's guns, bombs or weapons. However, one can hack the enemy's information weapons in Hybrid Warfare (Haque, 2009).
3. Hybrid Warfare is problematic because there are no Geneva conventions to enforce norms of acceptable behaviour (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999, p.58).
4. The total failure of expensive military hardware and techniques to overcome not just traditional low technology weaponry but also the failure of expensive military hardware by the creative and dynamic use of the technology available to all by the non-state actors.
5. If traditional war centred on an enemy's physical strength and 4GW on his moral strength, the Hybrid Warfare would focus on his intellectual strength.

LEVELS OF HYBRID WARFARE

Hybrid Warfare like other forms of warfare essentially has strategic, operational and tactical levels of war; but their manifestation is non-conforming to the previous generations. Unlike other generations of war, one wrong action at the tactical level in Hybrid Warfare can cause ripples at strategic levels. There are three levels to such conflicts: moral, mental and physical level. It is considered that the physical level, i.e. the active use of force is the least powerful in such conflicts (Li, 2008, p.66). The mental and moral domains of hybrid warfare have a direct impact on the operational and strategic levels of conventional warfare. Any aggression in the moral dimension of hybrid warfare will have a strategic impact on the adversary.

Figure 3: Hybrid Warfare - Levels of War.



“War is a moral contest, they are won in temples long before they are ever fought”

Sun Tzu, Art of War

The nature and dynamics of conflicts are changing both at regional as well as global arena thus posing a severe threat to conventional state structures and military doctrines. The number of conflicts between traditional armies has reduced after the cold war, but the nonlinear and non-kinetic forms of warfare are on the surge. The meanings of victory and defeat are also transforming due to the changing nature of conflicts and associated objectives. Notwithstanding the ambiguity around the definition of the concept, it appears that Hybrid Warfare is very much a reality and has, in fact, seen light of the day in many parts of the world. The Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe, Arab Spring and Russian intervention in Ukraine, all are examples of Hybrid War with varying shades and influences. After going through perspectives of different nations around the world, the fact can be underpinned that every nation defines Hybrid Warfare depending upon their thinking

and strategic environment. Because of these reasons, there is no universally accepted and agreed-upon definition of Hybrid Warfare.

Hybrid warfare actors operate in physical, mental and moral domains to undermine the adversaries. The lines are blurring between the war and peace owing to the very nature of Hybrid Warfare. Media, weak diplomacy, internal fault lines, political instability and fragile economy, are the major enablers of Hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare's preference over direct application of military instruments - at least in the initial stages of a conflict - is because of the very nature and spirit of war. Since the ultimate objective of belligerents in a conflict is to achieve victory regardless of the means employed, hence it is natural that one would like to pick the most economical and cost-effective tools from the inventory thus minimizing own losses. Moreover, one tends to bring the adversary on the most challenging turf to fight, thereby reducing chances of his adversary's success and increasing his own. The primacy of hybrid warfare with the onset of the 21st century is due to unprecedented advancement in technology and globalization; more so information technology which affords instant connectivity and synergy among various strands of hybrid war.

Since hybrid warfare employs a host of means in a well-coordinated and synchronized manner against the target state, therefore, the traditional mind set of defending the state with kinetic means is not an appropriate response to such aggression. The threat has to be identified and responded with superior imagination, coordination and execution with the highest level of jointness and cooperation among all elements of national power. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that states which fail to sense the gravity and enormity of the threat and leave its response to military means alone would do so only at their peril. A successful response to hybrid onslaught demands intricate, timely and smooth cooperation and coordination among various stakeholders that include state institutions, masses, economic structures, media, think tanks and international like-minded organizations/countries. A methodical approach to the subject from assessing own vulnerabilities to correct and comprehensive threat assessment and superior response at all tiers vertically and horizontally would be required to defeat the threat successfully.

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