



Ethnic Problem in Pakistan: A Case of Baluchistan (1999-2013)

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Abstract:

Baluchistan's stability is highly reliant on the influence of various factors that have failed since its inception. Despite its enormous geostrategic importance and natural resource wealth, the province has experienced unrest and perturbations as a result of poor governance. Between 1999 and 2013, a qualitative research approach with an exploratory method was used to investigate the Balochistan mayhem in Pakistan. The primary and secondary sources used to learn about Balochistan's issues and problems. The current study sought to identify the major ethnic schisms in Balochistan from 1999 to 2013. How did insurgencies begin in Balochistan during the General Musharraf era? And what were the reasons for the ethnic mobilization of Baloch in the province? It is noted that the holistic approach of the Federal and Provincial governments can help Balochistan get out of its current bind. The political diffusion has created a nonconforming landscape. It provides a realistic transformation mechanism to address this simmering issue. According to the study, the lessons from the East Wing's political unrest in the 1970s should be learned and a way-out policy should be devised and implemented because people in Balochistan are patriotic,

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INTRODUCTION

Baluchistan's stability is largely dependent on the influence of various factors that appear to be failing since 1947. Despite its massive geo-strategic magnitude and wealth in natural resources, the largest province of the country in terms of area is suffering unrest and disturbances as a result of poor governance. Pakistan's better prospects and prosperity are inextricably linked to Balochistan. The current situation in Baluchistan necessitates a stance that is essential to Pakistan's stability. Balochistan, Pakistan's largest province, covers an area of 134,050 square miles. It shares borders with Iran to the west, Afghanistan to the north-west, KP to the north, Punjab to the north-east, and Sindh to the east. The Baloch are 2,000-year-old ethnic group (Shad, 1987).

Its coastline stretches for 750 kilometers (466 miles) along the Arabian Sea from near Karachi to Gwadar port, close to the Iranian border. Balochistan is home to Pakistan's natural gas reserves,

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which are controlled by the Bugti and Kalpar tribes (Hasnat, 2012). According to Western researchers, Baloch are a mix of various nations, and the Balochi language has insights of Persian and Pashtu (Holdich, 1910). Most Bloch people appear to have resettled in their current native soil since the thirteenth century, becoming linked with Sindhi, Punjabi, and Dravidian communities that have settled the Jhalawon area near the eastern part of Balochistan (Frye, 1961). The original inhabitants of Balochistan are the Brohi, who speak Brahvi, a Dravidian language. Between 100 and 1330 AD, different tribes of Persian-Kurd-Sensitic origins migrated into Balochistan and became known as the Balochi tribes. The indigenous Brohi tribes (Mengal, Langov, Zehri, Bangulzai, Bizenjo, Qambrani, etc.) coexisted with the migrant Balochi tribes (Rind, Lashari, Bugti, Marri, Dombki, Kurd, Khetran, Naushervani, etc.) and accepted each other as compatriots. Many Baloch and Brohi tribes later continued their migration to greener pastures in Sindh and Punjab. Today, the Balochi population in Sindh is more than three times that of Balochistan, and in Punjab it is nearly five times that of Balochistan (Ghani,2013).

Baloch ethnicity garnered delayed identity during British rule in the Subcontinent, and Baloch national recognition during British withdrawal from united India. It has aided in the development of an archetype case, highlighting the new paradigm of nationalism. In the case of the Baloch, two grave incidents became the root cause of their mobilisation during the British Raj until the first half of the twentieth century. The obvious response to these problems was nationalism (Axmann, 2009). Balochistan was comprised of "Kalat, Makran, Lasbaila, and Kharan," but in 1955, the Sardars of these states reached an agreement with the "Governor-General of Pakistan" for the formation of the "Balochistan States-union." The Khan of Kalat and a number of tribal leaders agreed to give up:

"All his rights, authority and powers as President of the Council of Rulers of the Union, together with all his territories including the territories known as the leased areas, and shall vest in the Governor of the Dominion (Pakistan) all powers, authority and jurisdiction for the governance of the said Union" (Official agreement concerning the Baluchistan States Union merger, 1955).

LITERATURE REVIEW

In his book "The Baloch and Balochistan: A Historical Account from the Beginning to the Fall of the Baloch State," Naseer Dashti outlines the birth of Baloch as a state and its tumultuous history alongside powerful neighbours such as Persians and Britishers. It has discovered the environment of long-drawn-out disagreements and clashes surrounded by Baloch and Iranian states (Dashti, 2012).

In 2013, Zahid Latif Mirza stated that Balochistan is in turmoil due to its geostrategic location, tribal vibrant role, and presence of non-state actors. Since the 1947 partition, the province has been steadily sinking into a quagmire with staid and continuing insinuation for Pakistan, owing to a distorted vision of national security. The condition can be well managed in the presence of both internal and external pressures. Provide Baloch ethnic groups with competence, objectivity, and sincerity in dealing with these growing challenges (Mirza, 2013).

In his article, Muhammad Saleem Mazhar (2012) elaborated on how Balochistan, Pakistan's largest province, became a part of the country after the British left India in 1947. In 1972, it was elevated to the level of a province. However, it is worth noting that the location of Balochistan is significant due to its strategic location, which shares borders and sea with the Iranian Plateau, Central Asia, and the

Arabian Sea. It has recently gained prominence in the global media, and the debate has amplified. The Baloch want to be freed and divided. The authors have discussed the factors that have resulted from the United States' increased interest in the province, as well as other distant concerns that must be addressed.

Farhan Hanif Siddiqi (2012) has well highlighted the Balochistan issue, describing Balochistan as having two distinct ethno-national groups. The province has been shaped by the doppelganger pressures of native nationalism and jihadist groups, which have encased their mountainous territory from Quetta to the north of Makran. Locally, the issue in the region remained a source of contention for Pakistan, culminating in various insurgencies after the colonial era. On the religious front, it has been under scrutiny since 2009, with the US claiming that Quetta and other areas of Balochistan are safe havens for terrorists. It has also been observed that sectarian conflict (Shia-Sunni) created a fissure in Quetta.

The study was carried out to ascertain the root causes of the Balochistan issue, with a particular emphasis on the regime of General Pervez Musharraf. The study has academic value because it contributes to the available insufficient literature on the issue, which needs to be resolved immediately. Balochistan is receiving attention on national and international forums, as well as in the media, but governments appear hesitant to realize the seriousness of the problem. This study would highlight the problematic issue that arose following the assassination of Akbar Bugti during General Musharraf's regime.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Secondary sources were used to collect data because of the nature of the research study. The analysis was based on coverage and responses in national and international media. A literature review on the readily available delve into work was conducted using information found in numerous news articles and research journals. The findings of the study were based on secondary sources that were available.

RATIONALE OF BALUCHISTAN'S DISCONTENTMENT: AN OUTLINE

During General Musharraf's regime (1999-2008), the use of coercive military pressure to control the Baloch tribal resistance increased; as a direct consequence, hostility and animosity increased from 2004 to 2007, but any discontent within the country was sacked by General Musharraf (Hasnat, 2012). When an annoyance became too much for him, he said,

"There is no military operation going on in the province nor is there any need for such an operation. There is no unrest in Balochistan as its people look forward to benefiting from the unprecedented development projects; it is only a handful of vested interests who are involved in recent acts of sabotage at a few places" (Pakistan Times, 2015).

Later, in March 2008, the newly elected federal government requested an apology from the Baloch groups for previous mishandlings. The following is an explanation of the key Baloch grievances:

A. Ethnicity and Culture

Baloch, Pashtun, and Brahui are the three largest ethnic groups in Balochistan. Despite its dense population, the province has a remarkable racial and tribal diversity (Balochistan-Civil Military


relations, 2012). According to the National Census-1998, the province's total population was 132.3 million, with Baloch constituting 3.57 percent of the total population of around 4.72 million. Balochistan is home to nearly 3.59 million Baloch people (2.71 percent of the national population) (Wirsing, 2008). Baloch people believe in planning and became a minority within their own country through planned genocide. This decrease is the result of two factors;



- The incursion of Afghans as a result of the US led war in Afghanistan.
- Gwadar's growth is attracting non-Baloch entrepreneurs to the region (Wirsing, 2008).

Pashtuns in Balochistan both claim that the province is bi-ethnic, but Pashtuns are significantly under-represented in the provincial skeleton due to exaggeration by their locals (Sial & Basit, 2010). Aside from that, the Sunni-Shia religious conflict is escalating as a result of the targeted killings of Hazaras. Balochistan has the lowest annual growth rate when compared to the other three provinces, where 48 percent are below the national average and 5 percent live in rural areas with no access to food or basic necessities. (Conflict in Balochistan, Report of HRCP fact finding mission, 2005).

B. Lack of Power Sharing

Power-sharing that is equitable fosters government authenticity and a sense of public fairness among citizens. Power-sharing plans, such as quotas in civil services and resource distribution, are effective tools for conflict resolution. The following graphs highlight the representation of individuals from different provinces on the top three positions of the state.





According to the pie graphs, Balochistan has the lowest power distribution of any province. Punjab has the highest share, while KP is relatively fortunate due to an established academic framework and an adequate share in the military and bureaucracy. In Sindh, the situation is stable, with Karachi (the port city) serving as the center of economic activity due to its international significance. Sindh, on the other hand, has three Prime Ministers and a President who have all supported the province in gaining political benefits.

Economic and political dispossession of the Baloch is a driving force behind Baloch nationalism. Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali was elected Baloch Prime Minister in November 2002. (National Assembly Debates, 2012). The Baloch made up only 2.71 percent of the assembly's total membership. President Asif Zardari is also of Baloch origin (Bansal,2010). According to the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Punjabis made up 54 percent of the Pakistan Army in 2011, a decrease from 61.7 percent in 2001. Baloch have a 4 percent representation in the institution, up from 2 percent in 2001. (Balochistan-Civil Military relations, 2012).

Table:1 Social Indicators of Pakistan and Balochistan

Indicator	Pakistan	Balochistan
Literacy (Overall)	47%	26%
Literacy (Female)	33%	15%
Primary Schools	68.3%	49%
Enrollment (Overall)	49.2%	21%
Female Enrollment		
Access to Sanitation	18%	7%
Infant Mortality Rate (Per 000' Live Births)	100	108
Village Electrification	75%	25%
Access to Drinking Water	86%	20%

Source: "Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan", (November, 2005)

C. The Economic Factors

Historically, we see Baloch leaders or tribal Sardars raising concerns about revenue distribution, which they believe is not justified by the Federation (Malik, 2013). Balochistan is the least developed and least urbanized province, according to the 1998 census, with only 23.3 percent of Balochistan's population living in towns, while the countrywide city population stands at 33.4 percent. Balochistan had 0.06 million unemployed people in 2009-10, out of a total of 3.05 million in Pakistan (Balochistan-Civil Military relations, 2012).

Table 2: Yearly Growth Rate: Trends in Regional Inequality (%)

	2001-02 to 2005-06			2005-06 to 2007-08			2007-08 to 2009-10		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Punjab	5.9	10.5	9.1	-1.3	-0.6	-0.9	3.4	6.7	5.6
Sindh	1.9	8.9	6.1	2.2	-9.6	-2.9	2.0	2.0	3.0
KP	9.0	8.8	9.1	-7.3	-1.5	-2.7	3.3	5.3	5.0
Balochistan	-3.0	-3.0	-2.5	8.1	-1.6	3.2	0.5	-2.5	-0.6
Pakistan	4.4	9.3	7.8	-0.3	-2.2	-1.4	2.8	5.3	4.7

Source: *The state of economy: Devolution in Pakistan, 2011*

According to Table 02, Balochistan has experienced the lowest annual growth rate in Pakistan, with the exception of the period from 2005-06 to 2007-08 in which Balochistan had a growth rate of 3.2 % while Pakistan had an overall growth rate of -1.4 percent. (Balochistan-Civil Military Relations, 2012) (Wirsing, 2008). (Kureshy& Ahmad, 1977). Balochistan's economy is based on mineral resources such as "coal, chromite, Sulphur, marble, limestone, magnesium carbonate, natural gas, copper, uxite, iron," among other things.

D. Grievances f Balochistan

Balochistan is an underdeveloped region, but not due to a lack of resources, as the Baloch claim. It covers 36 percent of the country's energy and mineral resources, with Sui-gas being the primary source. Because of the presence of Tribal Sardars, it is difficult to exploit the rich resource land's resources (Bansal, 2010). Pakistan is experiencing a severe energy crisis, and Balochistan's natural resources can facilitate in mitigating the crisis, which will undoubtedly benefit development and industry. Balochistan accounts for between 36 and 45 percent of Pakistan's total natural gas production (Wirsing, 2008). It is irrational that a province has abundant natural resources but its people are backward and underdeveloped, while other provinces continue to benefit from its resources (Malik, 2013).

E. Baloch Tribe's Reservations on Regional Development Projects

The federal government has started mega projects in Balochistan for the economic development like

“Gwadar port, Makran coastal highway, Saindak copper project, Sabakzai, Mirani dams, Kachhi Canal and Iran Pakistan India (IPI), and Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) gas pipelines”.

These massive projects will also bring prosperity to Balochistan and are expected to create more economic opportunities for the natives and the entire country (Bansal, 2010). China started to construct the Gwadar Port near the Makran Coastline Highway. The port intends to serve as a trade corridor for Central Asian countries, connecting them to China (Wirsing, 2008). Hundreds of Baloch were employed in the Gwadar projects for the completion of phase one (Grare, 2006). It was promised that locals would be involved in Gwadar projects through recruitment, but the promises were not kept by the higher authorities. They believe that megaprojects will bring prosperity to the province by transforming the Baloch, but the reality is quite the opposite, as they are converting into a minority in their own land while non-Baloch people are benefitting from these projects (Grare, 2006).

F. Poor Governance

Another issue in the province is poor governance, which, according to a survey conducted by the “Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), is exercised by authorities other than Baloch. The political and local provincial governments are regarded as totally inadequate to deal with internal provincial issues. Because of the blame game and lack of information, the provincial government is unable to manage the region's governance ('Balochistan-Blinkered Slide into Chaos,' report on HRCP fact-finding mission, June 2011). Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed described the situation as follows:

“Along with this, the majority of the legislators are the tribal elite who are receiving the development funds but are not currently using these resources for the benefit of the masses” (Iqbal, 2012).

G. Maintaining Law and Order

According to Sardar Akhter Mengal, “there were 35,000 FC, 12,000 Coast Guards, 1150 Levies, and 6,000 Balochistan Reserve Police, 2,000 marines, and four army brigades deployed in Balochistan.” Balochistan is divided into 27 administrative districts. It is further subdivided into two categories, 'A' and 'B.' The first is made up of cities and towns that are controlled by the government and

Frontier Corps. It accounts for 5% of the total area. The second area, which includes the remaining 95 percent of Balochistan, is subject to levies. Levies are paid by the Provincial Government through the chieftains and are used to employ and maintained by tribal chieftains. Levies maintain 286 Thanas (police stations) and employ 13,357 officers (HRCP, 2005). Another issue in the province is the presence and involvement of the Frontier Corps (FC). The increasing kidnapping and killing of Baloch nationalists is a concerning trend. According to the HRCP Report on Balochistan (2005-06), Frontier Corps has established 493 checkpoints, and natives have filed complaints about mistreatment by the FC personnel (HRCP, 2005). Furthermore, mines are found along roads, tracks, fields, deserts, railway tracks, as well as around and in other public places, schools, and settlements, denying the common people access to their basic necessities. In 2006, 29 people were killed when a tractor hit a landmine in Gujji Nullah. Only 1,424 incidents involving improvised explosive devices were reported during timeframe of 2009-2012. (Ahmad, 2012).

H. The Disappearances and Targeted Sectarian Killings

During Musharraf's Martial Law, numerous people were reported "missing" in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan. Many believe that these people were kidnapped by intelligence agencies and accused of terrorism and anti-state activities. Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan states that "the names of missing persons be identified and the following actions be taken immediately, after verification, in any case, if they are found to be in custody."

- Those people who have no charges against them should be released.
- Those persons against whom there are charges be brought before a court of competent jurisdiction within seven days for trial (effective from the date of promulgation of commission).
- Such persons be allowed legal consul of their choice" (National Assembly debates, Official report, IV1, November 24).

Despite the AHB document's pledge to deal equitably with the issue of missing persons, the controversy over the number of missing and their whereabouts has remained a source of great concern for their relatives and friends. According to government figures, there were 6,000 to 8,000 missing people from Balochistan during the Musharraf era by the end of 2009. According to Prime Minister Gillani, there were 992 missing people in December of that year, of which 262 were eventually released from government custody. Few people were accused of being terrorists and were apprehended by law enforcement agencies, but during Musharraf's presidency, he targeted those who opposed his presidency and were accused of being anti-state actors (Hasnat, 2012). (Wash, 2011). The sectarian killings of Hazaras Shia reveal a lack of law enforcement in Balochistan ("Balochistan- Blinkered Slide into Chaos", HRCP Report, 17). Mir Hasil Khan Bazenjo claimed responsibility for the deaths of over 1700 Punjabi or non-Baloch people, as well as 1200 settlers (Samad, 2014).

I. Foreign Elements

It is suggested that federal and provincial authorities address the situation in the region and identify the foreign factors involved in undermining security and stability. Senator Mushahid Hussain assumed the following:

“Generally, there can be numerous foreign involvements in Balochistan even though we have been continuing to search for real proofs. The issue is that should you provide an opponent or even a foe and when a person creates an issue in your own home, rarely anticipate the fact that enemy would certainly like you to be on the hook. They may attempt to exploit it for the optimum” (Malik, 2013).

In 2004, “Ex-Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yusuf” revealed that the “Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)” had established terrorist funding in Baloch territory. The Indian involvement inside cannot be dismissed because India could put pressure on Pakistan by exploiting the Balochistan situation and bargaining with Pakistan on Kashmir (Grare, 2006) (Wirsing, 2008). (Bansal, 2010). Musharraf accused Brahamdagh Bugti of belonging to and supporting the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), but Brahamdagh denied the charge but instead later proved it by applying for Indian asylum. Iran played a role due to her growing concerns about the US-Pakistan proposal to use Balochistan land for a terrain against Iran (Grare, 2006). Kulbhushan Singh Yadav, an Indian undercover agent, was apprehended in Balochistan with an Iranian passport. According to Rehman Malik, the former Interior Minister (2009-2013), India, Afghanistan, and Russia were all involved in fomenting unrest in Balochistan, which was led by the Baloch Liberation Army (Bansal, 2010).

Baloch insurgent training camps continued to operate inside Afghanistan as the conflict-ridden country was probably sheltering the Baloch insurgents. The resolution asserts that the Baloch people are divided into regions in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and that the Baloch in Pakistan, in particular, are now subjected to assaults and extrajudicial killings, implying that they have a right to self-determination. Furthermore, the US involvement in Balochistan may be intended to restrain the growing Chinese influence at Gwadar port, which was built with Chinese assistance and thus provides China with optimal opportunities to wield its influence in the region. Furthermore, because the port is close to a US base in the region (Diego Gracia), the US may view it as a strategic risk.

J. Killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti

In 2005, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and other leaders presented the then-government with a fifteen-point agenda for provincial autonomy. However, the government rejected it. Nawab Akbar Bugti and Mir Balloch Marri, who were accepted as local leaders but were declared killed as traitors by the government, were assassinated. Provincial autonomy was granted to all provinces under new constitutional changes in 2010 (Rashid, 2013). (Hasnat, 2012).

K. Miscellaneous Demands

As previously stated, Baloch political leaders have grievous reservations. Some of these reservations have been classified in the following table;

Table 3: Miscellaneous Grievances and Problems of Balochistan

Grievances / Problems	Classification
Lack of political representation	Pakistan-related
Underrepresentation in the army/civil service	Balochistan-related
Domination by the establishment	Pakistan-related

Low literacy rate	Balochistan/Pakistan-related
Poverty	Balochistan/Pakistan-related
Socio-economic disparity	Pakistan-related
Menace of the Sardari system	Balochistan-related

Baloch nationalist parties “National Party, BNP (Mengal), and Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP)” contested in the 2013 elections. It was a proclamation that nationalists were willing to collaborate with the federal government. The results of the 2013 elections led to the formation of a coalition government comprised of the “Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) and the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN).”

L. Aghaz-I-Huqooq-I-Balochistan (AHB)

The Pakistan People’s Party-led coalition began by expressing unconditional regret to the Baloch. It came forward to propose the (AHB) package as a reconciliation device. This package's three critical components were:

- Recovering missing persons.
- Cuts to federal security agencies.
- Providing employment opportunities for Baloch graduates

Despite a renewed effort, the coalition led by the Pakistan People's Party did not serve the region and did not resolve their core issues. The missing persons issue remained at an all-time high. The region was served by a provincial government that was underperforming. Finally, the promise to fulfil the employment package was extremely slow in comparison to the prospect (Rumi, 2016). The parliament established a follow-up structure based on the following provisions:

E. Monitoring Mechanism

- A “Parliamentary Committee on National Security” was formed and suggested that its report be presented to the forum every three months. The two Houses will each set aside appropriate time for discussion of the report.
- The Senate also established a second Standing Committee. It would be required to present a report after three months of work on the issues, and the chairman would be responsible for sending it to the speaker of the National Assembly (National Assembly debates, Joint session, 1, November 24).

AHB, like other initiatives, mentioned in the “murder of Nawab Akbar Bugti” in Clause (14), that stated,

“A fact-finding Commission headed by a retired Judge of the Supreme/High Court be constituted to determine the circumstances leading to the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti Shaheed (martyr).” (National Assembly debates. Joint session, 1, November 24).

The most significant 18th Amendment Article 172 (3) states that;

“Subject to the existing commitments and obligations, mineral oil and natural gas within the province or the territorial waters adjacent thereto shall vest jointly and equally in that Province and the Federal Government”.

Senator Mian Raza Rabbani has said;

“This amendment has brought a sea change in terms of allocation of resources and in terms of meeting the Baloch nationalists’ demand of having control over their own natural resources. He was of the view that Balochistan stands to gain the maximum out of all the provinces with reference to the amendment of the Article 172. It has now given fifty percent of the ownership of the natural resources, gas and oil for example, to the provincial government whereas prior to this amendment, the federal government had the complete ownership of such resources” (“Debates”, Joint Session, Vol. XX, No.1-15).

The amendment was criticized for keeping only a few functions of the transferred Ministries or Divisions at the federal level. It was a major contributor to poor performance and vulnerable organizational contours, which were already a source of contention in regulating the functions under the 18th amendment. As it was necessary to make the 18th Amendment operational in order to fulfil administrative, legal, and monetary responsibilities at the provincial level. To deal with national issues, there was a strong desire to bridge control and teamwork between the federal and provincial governments. The allocation of a share to the provinces in the “divisible pool” increased from 47.5 percent to 56 percent in the fiscal year 2010-11, and it increased to 57.5 percent to 56 percent in the fiscal year 2010-11, to be maintained at 57.5 percent in the following years (Dawn, 2009). The Dawn newspaper elaborated on it as follows:

“The hammering out of a consensus among the Centre and the provinces on the seventh NFC award was a major achievement and a positive event for those who believed that the future of a vibrant Pakistan lied in a democratic federation” (Dawn, 2009).

The Balochistan package and new reforms would contribute to a more functional federal process, as promised in the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award and as guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan.

CONCLUSION:

Unfortunately, Balochistan has a tumultuous history in which various warriors came and fought alongside the local tribal men. Balochistan, the land of brave people, remained problematic during the British Raj and later became a part of Pakistan, but the situation has deteriorated since 1947. Balochistan, the land of brave people, remained problematic during the British Raj and later became part of Pakistan, but the situation has deteriorated since 1947. The land of the Baloch tribes is dry, with borders with Iran, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Sea.

The major causes of poverty in Balochistan are political marginalization caused by poor governance and unresolved grievances by the state. Despite being rich in natural resources, the per capita income is lower than the national average. According to Selig Harrison (1981), “the conviction that Baluchistan contains vast, untapped natural wealth is central to the separatist creed.” Baksh Bazenjo (Governor) declared in the “Kalat State Assembly” in December 1947 that “Pakistan officials say that Balochistan should join Pakistan because it would not be able to sustain itself

economically.” We have mineral resources, petroleum, and ports. The question is, “Where would Pakistan be if we didn't exist?” Siddiqi (2012).

Balochistan contributes 4% to Pakistan's GDP and meets 40% of the state's total energy needs through natural gas, coal, and electricity (Samad, 2014) however, the federal government was unable to spend due share of the province on its needs and addressing its issues. Furthermore, in 2009, the “7th National Financial Commission (NFC)” modified and added for poverty and backwardness, so the share for the larger provinces may increase and decrease in other provinces, but it is immersed by the increase in expansion funds for legislators and payments to federal security agencies on Balochistan stability and security duty. Balochistan's political and administrative structures were quite weak and fragile during the General Musharraf era while it can be said that the assassination of Akbar Bugti was a major factor in the region's decades long instability.

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