

## THE ISSUE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND INDIAN SURROGATE WARFARE AGAINST PAKISTAN

Manzoor Ahmad Naazer<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

The paper elucidates Indian motives and means used to support separatist elements, insurgencies, and terrorist groups in Pakistan since the partition of sub-continent on communal lines that sowed the seeds of antagonistic relations between two states enmeshed mainly on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The paper employs the concept of surrogate warfare that India used against Pakistan to pursue the former's political and strategic objectives. India supported militant and criminal groups and separatist elements mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Balochistan besides Saraiki nationalists in Punjab. It sponsored Mukti Bahini and then invaded East Pakistan to dismember Pakistan in 1971, and; and backed criminal groups in Karachi, the financial hub of Pakistan. In the post 9/11, Indian RAW nurtured terrorism unleashed by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Baloch militants through using mainly Afghan soil and occasionally Iranian territory where its consulates function as RAW's "control room" for flaming terrorism in Pakistan. India's main aim is to force Islamabad to abandon the latter's support to the independence movement in Indian held Kashmir and to compromise on the issue of Jammu & Kashmir.

**Key Words:** India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Pashtunistan, surrogate warfare, insurgency.

### INTRODUCTION

India-Pakistan relations are enmeshed in historical rivalries and enmity because of outstanding bilateral disputes and political problems especially the core issue of Jammu & Kashmir (IJK), the disputed territory that ignited two major wars between the two states. IJK is rooted back to the partition of India on communal lines, the decision bitterly opposed by the leadership of All India National Congress (AINC) that propagated the idea of composite Indian nationalism. India was partitioned by British rulers on the demand of All India Muslim League (AIML) that championed the cause of Indian Muslims and put forth Two Nations Theory (TNT) that rejected the notion of composite Indian nationalism.

According to the partition plan; Muslim majority provinces of British India formed Pakistan; Hindu majority provinces remained in India, and; the princely states were supposed to accede to either India or Pakistan. The question of the accession of most of the princely states was settled peacefully except that of Manavadar, Junagarh, Hyderabad Deccan, and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). India forcefully occupied and annexed the former three into its union on the plea that their populace was mainly Hindu (though their rulers were Muslims). India also sought accession of J&K, predominantly a Muslim populated princely state ruled by a Hindu. It triggered an armed resistance by the Muslim inhabitants as well as the first war between India and Pakistan in 1948 that

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<sup>1</sup> Assistant Professor, Department of Politics & International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad. Email: [manzoor.ahmad@iiu.edu.pk](mailto:manzoor.ahmad@iiu.edu.pk)

internationalized the issue after it came on agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It was India which initially internationalized and raised the issue at UNSC that passed a resolution seeking ceasefire. Both states agreed to the ceasefire as well as to the UNSC resolutions that promised to give people of J&K the right of self-determination to decide if they want to join either Pakistan or India. However, the plebiscite has yet not been held though Pakistan consistently demanded to settle the issue in accordance with the UNSC resolutions. Since then, Pakistan vied to keep the issue alive through different means including raising it at international forums whereas India attempted to enervate the former's stance.

The paper examines India's tactics aimed mainly at undermining Pakistan's stance on IJK. This is not to say that Indian maneuvers had the sole aim as they could and would have diverse motives. This study, however, argues that one of the prime Indian objectives has been to emasculate Pakistan's stance on IJK. The study focuses on Indian surrogate warfare against Pakistan generally since 1947 but mainly after 9/11.

### **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

The study uses the concept of surrogate warfare to explain Indian means and motives against Pakistan. Krieg defines surrogate warfare as "the externalization of the burden of war, in all its facets, to a deputy, who can both supplement or substitute the capabilities of the soldier as an infantryman (Krieg, 2016). The concept entails a patron's outsourcing of "the strategic, operational, or tactical burdens" of a war, wholly or partially to "human and/or technological substitutes in order to principally minimize the costs of warfare to its taxpayers, policymakers, military personnel and the country or organization as a whole" (Krieg & Rickli 2019, pp.4-5). It allows patrons to discover new means to curtail "their own burden of war while still achieving their objectives" (Krieg & Rickli 2018). The notion of surrogate warfare serves as "an umbrella concept for more established concepts such as proxy, compound, or remote warfare by centering on the aspect of the externalization of the burden of warfare" (Krieg & Rickli 2019; pp.4-5).

The surrogates can either be human or technological platforms - a tactical force multiplier (Krieg, 2016). The former include mercenaries, insurgents, terrorist groups, transnational organizations, and private security or military companies. The technological platforms include "an unmanned air power or space power weapon." Krieg and Rickli asserts that the cyber domain which brings individual, non-states actors and states together is mainly "favourable for waging" surrogate warfare because "attribution is almost impossible" (Krieg & Rickli 2018). Besides, non-state actors, states can also become surrogate of proxies for other generally more powerful states. For example, Cuba, Israel and North Korea acted as Russian, American and Chinese surrogate in the cold war era. Thus, both patron and surrogate "can be either state or nonstate actors, although patrons tend to be primarily states" (Krieg & Rickli 2019, pp.4-5).

The phenomenon of surrogacy ranges from arming rebel groups to the use of armed drones, to cyber propaganda. Under the patron-surrogate relationship, the patron intentions may include to "substitute or supplement its military capability with means that it deems to be more economical, more effective, more clandestine, or even more ethical" (Krieg & Rickli 2019, pp.4-5).

Surrogacy can be direct, indirect or coincidental. In the direct surrogacy, the patron has a command-and-control system giving surrogate the strategic leadership and guidance and latter only enjoys a degree of tactical autonomy. Under this relationship, the discretion or deniability is not the “main motivating” force for the patrons who use surrogates to supplant or complement the former’s own power in the war theatre. In indirect surrogacy, the patron uses surrogates to substitute its own capabilities and provides the latter financial aid, training, and equipment, etc. to fight for the common cause. Under this relationship, both patron and surrogate have some convergence or “overlapping of strategic interests, [and] cooperation can be mutually beneficial.” In indirect surrogacy, the patron does not exercise control over the surrogate and instead outsource or externalize the strategic planning and execution to the latter. The relationship between the patron and surrogate is based on an old “Sanskrit principle” or proverb written in *Arthashastra* by Chanakya that reads “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” Indirect surrogates are generally parties to a conflict with the target state before a patron is involved. The patrons do not create the surrogates and instead use the states or groups to exploit existing conflicts for some strategic objectives (Krieg & Rickli 2019, pp.23-9).

### **ROOTS OF INDIA’S ENMITY TOWARDS PAKISTAN**

India’s enmity towards Pakistan is rooted in ideological, historical and religious factors. AIML believed that the partition of the Indian sub-continent was the only viable solution of the communal problem in the sub-continent and it would bring peace in the region. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, believed that both India and Pakistan would enjoy friendly ties modeled on US-Canada relations (Kux 2001, p.25; Kulkarni 2019; Ahmer, 2019). Even he intended to live in Mumbai after his retirement as Governor-General of Pakistan (Humayun 2010, p.49; Mc Grath 1996, p.2; Ahmed, I. 2014). Later on, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also said that Indo-Pakistan relations must have looked like “those between Sweden and Norway, countries which had to break apart in order to come closer together” (1969, p.102). However, these expectations could not materialize.

From the very onset, the attitude of AINC was “ambivalent” towards Pakistan. Indian leadership believed that Pakistan’s creation on an ideological basis and making it an Islamic republic was an anti-thesis of secularism that AINC professed. For them, the failure of Pakistan as well as of TNT was tantamount to the success of secularism and composite Indian nationalism (Maas 1996, pp.266-9). It was a motivating force behind Indian behaviour towards Pakistan. Thus, in the words of Bhutto, “India posed an ideological, as well as a military, threat to the nation’s survival” (1969, p.102). The partition had “left deep wounds on Hindu psyche.” The majority of Indian leaders, “with vivid memories of past oppression” in the hands of Muslims for many centuries, accepted partition as an “unavoidable expedient” which would be “short lived.” At worst, they hoped “Pakistan would eventually settle down as a deferential junior partner within an Indian sphere of influence.” The continued Indian “ambivalent attitudes concerning the existence of Pakistan” was embedded in these historical and psychological factors (Harrison 1991, p.23). Thus, India sought either Pakistan’s complete collapse or at least the latter’s weak position so that the former could establish its dominance in the region.

Indian leadership deliberately created problems for Pakistan so that the newly formed state collapses under its own burden; to gain control over geo-strategically highly significant land of J&K was part of this strategy. New Delhi also sought to undermine TNT through denying Pakistan J&K. Nevertheless, the forceful occupation of J&K was a well-considered decision on the part of Indian leadership and had far-reaching consequences. Jinnah while highlighting the importance of J&K for Pakistan had termed it as the latter's jugular vein because all rivers flowing into Pakistan either originate or pass through it (Mirza n.d. p.2; Kalis & Dar 2013, p.120). New Delhi through its occupation of J&K got a strategic edge over Islamabad as former being an upper riparian is in position to stop and divert waters of rivers flowing through Indian held Kashmir (IHK) to Pakistan.

It was because of the dispute over J&K that Pakistan and India fought over two major wars, i.e. in 1948 and 1965, besides limited wars in 1984 and 1999. After the 1948 war, India brought this issue to the UNSC that asked both countries to stop the war and decide the issue in accordance with the aspirations of the people of J&K through holding a plebiscite in the disputed territory. Since then, the issue is on the UNSC agenda and its several resolutions await implementation. Later on, India took the position that the issue was settled after it held farce elections in the occupied territory in 1951 (Wasi, 2009). However, Pakistan did not accept Indian claims and demanded the issue be resolved in accordance with UNSC resolutions. Pakistan throughout this period raised this issue at different global forums including UNO that generally pressured New Delhi. The issue of J&K took a new turn after 1989 when resentful Kashmiri youth decided to start arms struggle against Indian occupation forces. In the 1990s, IJK and militancy in IHK remained the core issues in Indo-Pakistan relations. New Delhi accused Pakistan of sponsoring militancy in IHK, the charges Pakistan always denied. Islamabad declared that it only provided political, diplomatic and moral support to Kashmiri freedom fighters.

Nonetheless, India used different means to thwart Pakistan's position on IJK including the latter's alleged support to militancy in IHK. Indian policy remained unchanged though its tools varied over the years. The following sections of the paper highlight the tactics India used against Pakistan to undermine the latter's stance on IJK.

### **INDIAN SURROGATE WARFARE AGAINST PAKISTAN**

India secretly supported separatist movements as well as subversive and terrorist activities in various parts of Pakistan since 1947, and a number of scholars have highlighted it too. For instance, Harrison noted, India provided "intermittent support" to Pashtun and Baloch separatists till the 1970s (Harrison 1991, p.23). Paliwal claimed that Indian "covert material support" to Baloch and Pashtun separatists was halted in 1974 (Paliwal 2016). Bajoria observed that India secretly supported Sindhi and Saraiki nationalists who wanted to create their separate states (Bajoria 2008). Cheema asserted that India supported separatist elements in Sindh province in the 1980s and in Balochistan at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Cheema 2008). However, this involvement and motives behind it need detailed discussion.

AIML had rejected the notion of composite or territorial Indian nationalism and instead, put forth the idea of Muslim nationalism based on religious ideology and the creation of Pakistan. AINC and its allies bitterly opposed it and bent upon to undo partition and undermine Pakistan's security as

well as the very foundation on which it was based upon, i.e. TNT and the Muslim nationalism. Thus, they promoted the idea of ethnic nationalism and cultivated the seeds of separatism in parts of Pakistan including East Pakistan. India played a “mid-wife” role in Pakistan’s dismemberment and creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

### **India’s Role in Disintegration of Pakistan in 1971**

In the post-independence era, India mainly strove to undermine Pakistan’s efforts to create a power equation in South Asia and rather aspired to establish its dominance in the region. India got the opportunity to dismember Pakistan and to institute its hegemony in the region in the wake of civil war in East Pakistan in 1971. India’s secret agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) established an information or PSYWAR Division. It tasked the media professionals from the ministry of information and army to launch propaganda campaign against Pakistan. It was aimed to ensure that world attention should remain concentrated on the ostensible brutalities by Pakistani troops in East Pakistan. New Delhi also created *Mukti Bahini* (MB) a terrorist organization and militant wing of Awami League (AL) and provided it weapons, training, and, fundings, etc. (Raman 2013, p.45) in its bid to separate East Pakistan and establish Bangladesh (Sisson & Rose 1991, p.212). Pakistan had to launch a military operation to bring an end to the wave of terrorism perpetuated by MB. Once MB was almost overpowered by Pakistani troops and situation apparently started improving, when India openly and directly intervened sending its troops into East Pakistan that led to the disintegration of the country on December 16, 1971. Indian leadership jubilantly claimed its credit and still does so. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, announced that she had “avenged a thousand years history.” She also declared to have drowned the TNT into the Bay of Bengal (Haider 2009, p.543). The current Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi also claimed the credit of creation of Bangladesh during his visit to Dhaka and stated that Indians had fought alongside MB for the creation of Bangladesh (Kamran, 2015).

India also sought to impose a settlement of IJK on Pakistan after the 1971 war. This yearning was reflected during the post-war talks that culminated in the Simla Agreement of 1972 between the two states. Before the war, New Delhi held the view that IJK was settled one after 1951 elections in the IJK and the territory was an integral part of India. However, Pakistan had never accepted this stance. During the talks, New Delhi believed that Pakistan’s position was weak following its military defeat and disintegration and presence of thousands of prisoners of wars in Indian jails. India deemed it a good opportunity to impose a solution of its choice on Pakistan. In order to get legitimacy for its forceful occupation of J&K, India attempted to get CFL declared as a permanent border between the two states. However, Pakistan did not accede to it. Nevertheless, both countries agreed to convert CFL into Line of Control (LOC) and to settle IJK through bilateral negotiations. Indian successive governments never participated sincerely in talks with Pakistan to resolve the core problem that ultimately gave rise to militancy in IJK.

### **India and Pashtunistan Issue**

India nurtured and supported the Pashtunistan issue in its bid to undermine Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity from the onset. It also sought to use this issue to undermine Pakistan’s stance on IJK and used a two-pronged strategy to advance its agenda. First, it strived to use historic and

political links of AINC with leaders of Khudai Khidmatgar Tehreek (KKT), to raise the Pashtunistan issue. Second, India used or supported Afghanistan on the issue to pressure Pakistan.

Pashtunistan issue was a brainchild of some leaders of AINC. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Pashtun nationalist leader of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), formerly North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and founder of KKT had a close alliance with AINC. KKT as did AINC bitterly opposed the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. Once the partition became imminent, on the behest of Congress leaders, Khan demanded the creation of an independent Pashtun state comprising of the Pashtunes living in NWFP or the latter's accession to Afghanistan (Pande 2011, pp.63-73; Rose & Kumar 1980, 248-9; Hasan 1964, p.56). The demand was made only when the partition of India had been accepted by British and AINC, though half-heartedly by the latter believing that Pakistan would be short-lived and would collapse under its own burden that would force Pakistani leaders to request for reintegration into the Indian union. The leaders of KKT made the demand of Pashtunistan ostensibly to undermine the newly created state of Pakistan and fulfill the AINC dream. Behind the demand, certainly involved Indian interests in the Pashtun areas where previously AINC had a considerable influence which it was likely to lose in the wake of the creation of Pakistan. As a commentator noted, "it was in the nature of a last gesture of despair" that the idea of Pashtunistan was promoted that also affected an alliance between India and Afghanistan (B. 1955, pp.393-4). However, this movement could not get support from the masses in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the Indian government promoted a propaganda campaign, from its own territory, on Pashtunistan issue. It sponsored the so-called "spokesmen for Pashtunistan" based in India to launch a propaganda campaign against Pakistan through publishing periodicals from Bombay and Delhi. The periodicals demanded the creation of Pashtunistan comprising of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), NWFP and Balochistan that in combination made more than one-half of Pakistan's total area (Wilber 1953, pp.492-3). This move was backed also by Indian political parties which organized a series of "Pashtunistan Day" celebrations in various cities on a regular basis (Pande 2011, pp.63-73).

The use of the Afghan government and territory by India was, however, highly instrumental in the entire episode. New Delhi did it for diverse reasons but undermining Pakistan's stance on IJK was a highly significant Indian objective. India mainly used Afghanistan by instigating or encouraging it to raise the Pashtunistan issue at the international level and provided diplomatic support former's stance and efforts to attract world attention at various forums including UNO. India, being pressurized by Pakistan on IJK at global forums, was "delighted to find grounds for criticizing actions by Pakistan" (Wilber 1953, pp.492-3). Reportedly, Indian commiseration for the issue was generally well known and it was "acutely interested in the outcome of this question because of its strategic implications for the whole region" (Rose & Kumar 1980, pp.248-9). It could have serious repercussions for the national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. India extended support to Afghanistan's claim over Pashtunistan issue in order to keep Pakistan's army preoccupied on its "restive western border" (Howenstein & Ganguly 2010) and to divert its "resources by cultivating the fear of an unstable western border" (Rubin & Siddique 2006, p.7). More precisely, it could substantially divert Pakistan's attention away from the Indian occupation of J&K and undermine the former's stance on IJK. In Pakistan's view, it was not a coincidence that Afghanistan raised the

Pashtunistan issue in late 1947 at a time when Indian troops were marching towards Pakistan in J&K (Pande 2011).

India and its allies such as Afghanistan and Russia kept on reviving this issue if and when contingencies so required. For instance, India strove to use Pashtun nationalists against Pakistan during Indo-Pakistan 1965 war. The war was mainly fought over IJK particularly after some uprising in IJK and Indian accusations of infiltration from Pakistan followed by skirmishes on the ceasefire line (CFL) that was agreed upon after Indo-Pak war in 1948. In 1965, Indian Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh met Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Kabul, and invited him “to pursue his struggle for Pashtunistan from New Delhi.” However, it could not get favourable response from Khan. During the war, India started a “diplomatic offensive on Pashtunistan” internationally and raised “the Baloch, Pashtunistan and the East Pakistan questions” at UNO. Meanwhile, All India Radio started an aggressive propaganda campaign while “broadcasting stories of armed Pashtun rebels coalescing along the border areas” (Paliwal 2016). Meanwhile, India along with Afghanistan started raising Pakistan’s “ethnic problems” at international forums and demanded the right of “self-determination” for Baloch and Pashtuns in Pakistan (Paliwal 2016). It was analogous to Pakistan’s raising of IJK at the global forums and demanding the right of self-determination for Kashmiri people. Fortunately, Afghanistan pursued a policy of “strict neutrality despite ‘external pressures’” during 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars and did not pose any military threat to Islamabad. In 1971, the Soviet Union exerted pressure on King Zahir Shah during his visit to Moscow to “follow a more pro-Indian policy” which he did not accept (Jillani 1993, p.38). Probably, it was one of the reasons due to which Zahir Shah was overthrown in a coup carried out by Soviet-trained military officers who brought Daoud Khan into power. Daoud Khan initially pursued pro-Moscow policy and remained extremely hostile towards Pakistan. However, he ultimately acknowledged the futility of confrontation towards Pakistan and decided to improve bilateral ties with the eastern neighbour. His changing perception of regional politics and efforts to normalize relations with the Muslim world including its neighbours especially Pakistan antagonized a segment of his supporters especially communists within and outside the country. It culminated in his brutal murder in a coup led by the leaders of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1978 that plunged the country into a long era of instability and bloodshed. Nonetheless, it derailed the process of normalization of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Pande 2011, p.72; Chaudhri 2014, pp.145-51; Border 1999, pp.123-4) that could have dissuaded India from using Afghan soil against Pakistan. India cultivated alliance with the Soviet installed PDPA government in Kabul and jointly conducted clandestine activities in Pakistan.

### **Indian Support for Sindhi Separatists**

In the 1980s, Indian RAW collaborated with KHAD and KGB, secret agencies of Afghanistan and Soviet Union, respectively, in order to undermine Pakistan’s security. In this period, RAW set up two covert groups, one for targeting Khalistani groups - the Sikh fighters who were struggling for the creation of independent Khalistan out of the Indian Union, and another to generally target Pakistan. Both groups carried out several acts of terrorism in Pakistan’s major cities more notably in Karachi and Lahore. Reportedly, India used terrorism as a tool to force Islamabad to abandon the latter’s alleged support for the Khalistan movement (Bajoria 2008). In this period, Pakistani

authorities arrested several RAW operatives involved in terrorist activities in the country and sentenced them to death or life imprisonment. A few of them, once released after long imprisonments publically accepted their crimes (“Meeting India’s angry spy,” 2012; “I was a spy,” 2008; Khan, I. 2013; Sarabjit Singh was,” 2013).

Meanwhile, India also used ethnic groups in Pakistan as its surrogates to coerce Islamabad for different reasons. One of its motives was to use these separatists movement to keep Pakistan under pressure, and to divert latter’s attention away from external (Indian) front particularly IJK. Yet another motive was to use nationalist movements to stop Pakistan’s alleged support for independence movements in India, such as Indian Punjab and IHK. For instance, the movement for Sindhudesh in Sindh province in Pakistan paralleled a separatist movement in Indian Punjab for the creation of Khalistan - the homeland of Sikhs in India. The roots of Sindhi nationalism and quest for autonomous status for the province dates back to the past mainly because of a sense of deprivation among the native Sindhis. However, the hatred towards Punjabi dominated central government intensified with the emergence of demand for a separate Sindhi state after hanging of former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto, who hailed from Sindh, by the régime of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1979 (Khan & Mushtaq 2017, pp.33-4).

India was sympathetic to separatist elements in Sindh and provided them covert support for its strategic objectives (Bajoria, 2008; Cheema, 2008). New Delhi mainly intended to use instability to counterbalance Pakistan’s ability to create unrest in IHK. As Thomas noted, New Delhi could emasculate Pakistan’s capability to destabilize IHK through undermining stability in Sindh. The former could undermine Pakistan’s ability to play “Kashmir card” through using “Sindh’ card.” Thus, he maintained, “instability in Sindh counterbalances instability in Kashmir” (Thomas 1996, p.10). However, India, later on, used the Sindh card to strike a deal with Pakistan to not support Sikh separatists demanding the creation of Khalistan. Thus, the movement for Sindhudesh died as Pakistan under the government of Pakistan People’s Party led by Benazir Bhutto decided to not use Khalistan or “Sikh card” against India during Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Islamabad in December 1988 (Naazer 2018, p.70).

### **RAW’s Clandestine Activities in Karachi**

Besides native Sindhis, a significant number of Urdu speaking people (generally known as Muhajir) also live in Sindh particularly in its big cities such as Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur etc. A section of disgruntled elements among them mainly living in Karachi reportedly aspire a separate province or even separation from Pakistan for diverse reasons. Both Sindhis and Muhajir ostensibly remained at loggerhead with each other due to their conflicting interests and priorities in the province. However, India deemed it useful to use both of them as its surrogates for its strategic interests. Thus, India strove to use a segment of Urdu speaking people besides Sindhi nationalist groups as its surrogates against Pakistan, principally to use them as trump card on IJK (Thomas 1996, p.10).

India’s RAW sponsored unrest, terrorism and criminal activities of various sorts in Karachi, Pakistan’s financial capital. It financed the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) to create unrest in Karachi since 1994. Indian RAW trained hundreds of “MQM militants in explosives, weapons, and



sabotage over the past 10 years in camps in north and north-east India.” Those trained include mid-ranking as well as junior party members of MQM (Bennett-Jones 2015; Ali 2015). Some of the terrorists arrested by the police told that they traveled to India through Bangkok and were trained in a RAW camp including the one at Dehradun. They were trained in bomb-making, handling sophisticated weapons and carrying out terrorist activities in Karachi (Ousat 2015). Karachi witnessed unrest and violence taking the lives of tens of thousands of people since the 1980s. Reportedly, political violence in Karachi claimed lives of over 10,000 people between 1986 and 1996 alone (Global Security Organization n.d.). Many thousands more were killed in the next two decades. MQM, besides other ethnic, religious and sectarian groups, was mainly responsible for various terrorist activities in Karachi and several of its topmost leaders had links with RAW (“Mustafa Kamal vows,” 2016).

### **India’s Multi-Prong Strategy in the Post 9/11 Era**

In the post 9/11 scenario, India used a multi-prong strategy, ranging from propaganda to open threats of a military attack against Pakistan and the use of terrorist groups against Pakistan to force the latter to abandon its policy on IJK. It forcefully used media, both Indian and international, academia and launched a diplomatic offensive to portray Islamabad as an epicenter of terrorism and to link it to the ongoing freedom struggle in IJK. For instance, Cohen noted that New Delhi did it utmost to get Pakistan declared as a “rogue state and the epicenter of terrorism” (Cohen, 2009). For this purpose, India strove to persuade the US to declare Pakistan as a “terrorist state.” It vigorously sought Washington to approve its claim that turbulence in IJK was predominantly because of Pakistan’s sponsored militancy (Gupta 1996, p.12). India also strove to divert the US-led global war against terrorism to the freedom struggle in IJK and “to score against Pakistan’s alleged involvement” in cross-border infiltration (Baral 2003, pp.80-1). Since 9/11, India ventured more resolutely to take advantage of the world public opinion against terrorism and to use it against Pakistan and the freedom movement in IJK. It sought the US government to include Kashmir in its crusade against terrorism (Akhtar 2011). However, successive Pakistani governments did not let the Indian dreams come true though they face increasing pressure and demands from the US officials to take action against the militant groups operating in IJK.

Meanwhile, India took advantage of the political change in Kabul after the US invasion and used Afghan soil to wage another dimension of surrogate warfare against Pakistan. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, India did not dare to condemn it or even publically express its displeasure. Instead, it established ties with Soviet installed successive governments in Kabul which tried to keep the Pashtunistan issue alive. After the fall of the Najib government, the last Soviet installed regime in Kabul, in 1992, Pakistan mediated among the competing mujahidin groups to form an interim administration led by Rabbani and Masood. However, sooner these leaders developed differences with Pakistan and turned hostile towards Islamabad. After the emergence of the Taliban, they formed the Northern Alliance. Due to their differences with Pakistan, India started supporting them for its political interests in the country, most notably to undermine Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. India provided them military assistance from its military bases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to leaders of Northern Alliance in the war against the Taliban. After the 9/11 and fall of the Taliban government, the Northern Alliance was able to grab power in Kabul.

India had close ties with the newly appointed President Hamid Karzai and several key government ministers who New Delhi successfully used to undermine Pakistan's interests in the country. India supported the Northern Alliance in its bid to not let any Pakistan-friendly regime come into power in Kabul for diverse security, political, and economic reasons (Howenstein & Ganguly 2010); especially the one that could prevent it from using Afghan soil against Pakistan.

In disguise of reconstruction and development activities, India got its foothold on Afghan soil in order to use it for surrogate warfare against Pakistan. India ventured to create an adequate "diplomatic and intelligence network" in Afghanistan in order to "monitor" and "curtail" Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. It started building road networks including the one on Pak-Afghan border that could serve, besides other purposes, to "pursue intelligence-gathering operations or espionage" against Pakistan. India pursued different development and reconstruction related projects including communication network in Afghanistan, including the roads linking it to Iran in order to decrease Kabul's dependence on Pakistan and increase the former's own political and economic clout in the region and beyond. Yet another reason for India's activities in Afghanistan is to avert a situation that could lead to revival or resurgence of militancy in IJK (Howenstein & Ganguly 2010).

### **India's Support to TTP and Baloch Separatists**

India used its diplomatic, intelligence and security network created under the guise of development work in war-torn Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era to unleash terror through its surrogates in Pakistan. It exploited the resentment among Taliban sympathizers who were opposed to Pakistan's support for US-led war against terrorism. It also re-established its links with the separatist elements in Balochistan who had a deep sense of deprivation due to various policies pursued by the successive governments in Islamabad. Indian RAW in collaboration with the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) used these linkages for its surrogate warfare against Pakistan.

Both RAW and NDS provided money, training, and weapons to TTP and other groups including Baloch miscreants to unleash terror in different parts of Pakistan. The civilian officials of federal and provincial governments besides military sources confirmed India's support for TTP. For instance, in 2009, the spokesman of Pakistan's military told the media that "large caches of weapons of Indian origin" were recovered from the TTP militants during a military operation in Mingora, KP. In 2015, a letter of Sindh home ministry revealed that RAW had provided Rs.20 million to TTP and other terrorist groups for spreading terrorism in Karachi. In 2016, Aftab Sultan, Director-General of Intelligence Bureau told Senate Standing Committee that "Out of the 865 terrorists arrested during the last three years, a significant number had connections with India's RAW and the Afghan NDS" (Naazer 2018, pp.94).

The evidence also suggests that TTP activists are being funded and nurtured by Indian RAW in close collaboration with Afghan NDS. For instance, the connections of these agencies with TTP terrorists were unveiled by the captured terrorists and the would-be-suicides. Such connections were also disclosed by an ex-TTP senior commander Latif Mehsud who was captured in Afghanistan by the US forces and later on handed over to Pakistan. He was in Afghanistan to collect funds and instructions by the Indian RAW and Afghan authorities. In his confession, he confirmed the Indian role in

sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan (Naazer 2018, p.94; "Striking revelations," 2013). Ehsanullah Ehsan, former spokesman of TTP also testified Indian and Afghan role in sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan. In a confessional statement during his custody under the security forces, he told that TTP leadership had contacts with Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies which provided them money and finance for terrorist activities in Pakistan. RAW and NDS also provided them travel documents for their movement in Afghanistan. TTP and other militant organizations "established committees in Afghanistan through which they communicate and coordinate with RAW." Before moving anywhere in Afghanistan, TTP leaders contact Afghan and Indian security officials, who "grant them passage and guide their infiltration attempts into Pakistan" (Naazer 2018, p.94; "TTP has links," 2017).

Besides, India also uses Iranian territory to foment troubles in Pakistan. Both India and Iran came closer and worked together to support Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. Since then, they cooperated in several fields including working together against Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan. As in Afghanistan, India in the guise of business, development and construction activities set up a spy network in Iran to use its territory for anti-Pakistan activities particularly to support the Baloch insurgency (Abrar, 2016). In 2016, Pakistan security forces held Kulbhusan Yadav, a senior Indian intelligence officer in Balochistan. He is a serving Indian naval officer and in his confessional statement, he accepted that he was involved in sponsoring terrorism and subversive activities in Karachi and Balochistan in which many Pakistanis lost their lives (Naazer 2018, p.94). A court in Pakistan found him guilty of his crimes and sentenced him to the death.

Pakistani officials believed that Indian consulates in Afghanistan and in Iran especially those close to Pakistan's border were fanning terrorism in the country. India used these consulates as "meeting places of Baloch separatists and operation centres for their terror operations" in Pakistan; Indian consulate in Kandahar was "actually a control room of all the terrorist activities organized by the separatist Balochistan Liberation Army" (Naazer 2018, pp.91-2; Izzadeen, 2009).

India in the disguise of reconstruction activities in Afghanistan deployed Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBPF) on the pretext of protecting the Indian embassy in Kabul and consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif ("Indo Tibetan border," 2016) as well as for the security of its workers and staff of construction companies. India deployed four companies of ITBPF for security during the construction of the road before 2008. Since then its number must have increased (Dholabhai, 2008). It opened consulates in various cities apparently for issuing visas to Afghan citizens. However, some of the consulates established in cities near to Pakistan's border were involved in subversive activities. Indian undercover intelligence officials in these consulates provided training, finance, and weapons to TTP and Baloch terrorists. They regularly met leaders of TTP and Baloch terrorist groups and the latter were even provided Indian passports to travel around the World. RAW directly funded Baloch terrorist groups including Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and Balochistan Republican Army (BRA) which had training camps in Kabul, Kandahar, and Nimroz in Afghanistan. Pakistan provided the necessary evidence to the Afghan government and demanded it to dismantle RAW's training camps and other terrorist networks on its territory ("Afghan govt must," 2015).

Afghan government serves, either intentionally or unintentionally, as an Indian surrogate against Pakistan for its own reasons. Afghan government uses TTP and other militant groups as part of its “tit for tat” strategy on Pakistan’s alleged support for the Afghan Taliban. It aspired to use them as “trump card” to bargain with Pakistan and force it to take action against the Afghan Taliban in the wake of US withdrawal (“Afghan govt tried,” 2013).

Pakistani officials strongly believe that India orchestrated several terrorist attacks in the country. Reports suggested that India’s RAW had a role in a terrorist attack on Army Public School, Peshawar on December 16, 2014 (“Is this for real?” 2015) that took lives of 145 people including 132 children, 10 school staff members, and three soldiers and left more than a hundred others wounded (Saifi & Botelho, 2014). The attack was carried out at the 43<sup>rd</sup> anniversary of the breakup of Pakistan.

India was also involved in a terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in March 2009. After holding a Pakistan-based militant group responsible for Mumbai attacks, India canceled scheduled tour of its cricket team to Pakistan in early 2009. Subsequently, on the request of Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB), Sri Lanka sent its team to play matches in Pakistan. The Sri Lankan team was attacked on its way to stadium leaving a few players injured. Some bystanders were killed in the incident (“Gunmen shoot Sri Lanka,” 2009). The incident closed the doors of international cricket in Pakistan since then. After the incident, the then Lahore Police Chief Pervez Rathore claimed that he had “credible evidence” of Indian involvement in the attack. He stated: “One thing is for sure that there is an Indian hand behind the attack” (“India involved in,” 2009). The rocket launchers and explosives used by the terrorists were generally in the use of Indian security forces. Soon after the incident, Sri Lanka Foreign Minister stated that the possibility of Indian involvement in the incident could not be ruled out (“Indian hand seen,” 2009; “Sri Lanka not,” 2009; “Lankan Foreign Minister,” 2009). Reportedly, Indian secret agency RAW had used its “frankenstein” LTTE for the terrorist attack (“Indian hand seen,” 2009). Later on, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani was told by the Sri Lankan President in their meeting in Libya that LTTE had provided funds for the attack in Lahore (“Tamil Tigers paid,” 2009).

Several Western scholars and leaders endorsed Pakistan’s claim that India was sponsoring terrorism in the country. For instance, Christine Fair of the Rand Corporation asserted, “it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan’s apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India.” She maintained that some of India’s consulates such as those situated in Mazar Shareef, Jalalabad and Qandahar in Afghanistan besides one in Zahedan in Iran were “not issuing visas as the main activity.” Some officials working in these consulates confided privately to her that they were “pumping money into Balochistan” (Naazer 2018, p.92; Feyyaz 2009, p.42). Indian consulates in Afghanistan had become “dens of India spies” and they were running “covert operations to destabilize Pakistan.” Pakistani officials claimed that they had enough evidence of TTP being financed and supplied weapons in Waziristan and Swat by RAW. Rozen citing an unnamed former US intelligence official, who served in the past in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, told: “The Indians are up to their necks in supporting the Taliban against the Pakistani government in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The same anti-Pakistan forces in Afghanistan also shooting at American soldiers are getting support from India. India should close its diplomatic

establishments in Afghanistan and get the Christ out of there” (Naazer 2018, p.92). Pant claimed that India’s embassy in Kabul was involved in spreading anti-Pakistan propaganda and its consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, and Qandahar sponsored activities to create unrest in Pakistan. In 2011, Chuck Hagal, who later on became US defense secretary, stated in a speech that India had “financed problems for” and sponsored terrorism in Pakistan by using Afghanistan as a second front for many years (Naazer 2018, p.93).

India analysts endorsed Pakistan’s view and explained Indian motives behind its surrogate warfare against Pakistan. For instance, Karnad asserted, “TTP is useful as an Indian counterpart of the various militant groups operating against Indian forces” in IHK. “Severing relations with TTP,” he maintained, “will mean India surrendering an active card in Pakistan and a role in Afghanistan as TTP additionally provides access to certain Afghan Taliban factions” (Naazer 2018, p.94). Another Indian analyst avowed that New Delhi needs to strongly back an insurgency in Balochistan in order to use it as a bargaining tool against Pakistan’s support to the freedom movement in IHK (Singh 2014). These statements explain India’s motives behind supporting terrorism in Pakistan.

India weighed various options on how to further inflame insurgency in Balochistan and to create problems for Pakistan. It contemplated doing it more openly what it has been doing “on the dark side.” India started raising the issue of Pakistan’s “alleged atrocities” in Balochistan to put diplomatic pressure on Pakistan internationally (Chaudhuri, 2016; Bhattacharjee & Haider, 2015; “PM Narendra Modi,” 2016). It issued them its travel documents for visiting abroad and contemplated: to give Baloch separatist leaders asylum in India; to make New Delhi a base for their activities, and; to use some of the Baloch asylum seekers to establish a “government-in-exile of Independent Balochistan” (Ahuja, 2016; “After Bugti,” 2016; Tripathi, 2016).

### **Pakistan Raises Issue of RAW’s Activities at Global Level**

Pakistani officials claimed that they captured several Indian nationals involved in sponsoring or perpetuating terrorism in the country including Balochistan and its evidence was shared with New Delhi. After Pakistan presented this evidence to the Indian leadership, New Delhi agreed to include the issue of India’s support to Baloch insurgents in a joint communiqué issued following the meeting of prime ministers of both countries at the sidelines of NAM summit at Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt in July 2009 (Izzadeen, 2009; “India interfering in,” 2009; “Pakistan gives evidence,” 2009).

Pakistan’s high level government officials and top leadership including its ministers particularly those of interior, defense, and foreign affairs separately and recurrently proclaimed that India was supporting terrorists in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan (“Sufficient proof of,” 2009; “India supporting terrorism,” 2010; “Solid evidence of,” 2010; “Malik alleges Indian,” 2010; “India supporting militancy,” 2010; “India’s Balochistan role,” 2009; Khan, 2016). Former President Zardari told that India was interfering in Balochistan and former Prime Minister Gilani raised this issue with his Indian counterpart in a meeting in Sharm El Sheikh (“Zardari says he,” 2009). Former President, Pervez Musharraf stated more than once that India was using Afghan soil to train, finance and providing weapons to terrorist groups in Balochistan and other parts of the country and his government had shared its evidence with Afghan President, Hamid Karzai (“India supporting militancy,” 2010; “India is responsible,” 2010).

The government of Nawaz Sharif raised the issue of India's intervention and support for terrorist activities in Pakistan at various forums including UNO "Pakistan has raised," 2016). It presented three dossiers containing the evidences of Indian interference in FATA, Balochistan, and Karachi to the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon in 2015 (Haider 2015). Pakistan presented similar dossiers to the new UNSG, António Guterres in January 2017 and July 2018 ("Pakistan hands over," 2017).

### **India's Motives behind its Surrogate Warfare against Pakistan**

India has assorted motives of its warfare against Pakistan through its surrogates of diverse nature. It uses tools such as propaganda warfare, naked threats of a military attack or air strikes on Pakistan and the use of former's proxies within Pakistan's territory or soil of its neighbouring states to coerce Islamabad. The foremost reason has been explained by J.S. Cohen that India wanted "its neighbors to be in awe of its power" (Cohen, 2009). New Delhi generally bullies its smaller neighbours through using terrorism besides other means as a tool to for the latter to change their policies according to Indian dictates and preferences. This is evidenced by Indian support to terrorism and insurgencies in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka (Naazer 2017; Naazer 2018).

The Indian main objective is to force Pakistan to change its policy on IJK and abandon support for the ongoing freedom movement in IHK. In order to pressure Pakistan diplomatically and politically, India propagates that Pakistan sponsored militancy in IHK and threatens that it could use its force to desist the latter from doing that. Despite its aggressive designs and political assertions, India has not been able to attack Pakistan after Islamabad developed nuclear weapons in the 1980s and detonated it in 1998. Nuclear weapons served as deterrence between the two states. Indian leadership believes that they could destroy Pakistan's armed forces if the latter is deprived of its nuclear weapon. Stephen Cohen described the Indian mindset in these words: "Not a few Indian generals and strategists have told me that if only America would strip Pakistan of its nuclear weapons then the Indian army could destroy the Pakistan army and the whole thing would be over" (Cohen, 2009).

Since India cannot gain its objectives through direct military intervention or airstrikes in the wake of nuclear deterrence, it has recourse to launch surrogate warfare against Pakistan for the pursuance of its goals. It mainly uses the Afghan government and soil to support terrorist groups fighting its war in Pakistan. For this reason, it opposes any group coming into power in Kabul that can prevent it from using Afghan soil against Pakistan. It also desires to relieve pressure on Kashmir by diverting Pakistan attention and resources on its internal problems, including terrorism and insurgencies besides troubled relations on the western border. India also fears that establishment of a Pakistan's friendly government and peace in Afghanistan would shift the attention and activities of militants from Afghanistan to IHK. It is worth mentioning that militancy in IHK that had started after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 dramatically reduced after the US invasion and resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It suggests that turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan diverted militants' attention away from IHK that enabled New Delhi to improve the security situation and consolidate its occupation there.

New Delhi also wants to use terrorist groups as a bargaining tool with Pakistan. Particularly, it aspires to use the Baloch card against Pakistan to trade off on IJK. It wants Pakistan to stop raising IJK at the global level particularly UNO and prevent the latter from giving moral and political support to the freedom struggle in the valley. It is also evidenced by the fact that as soon as Pakistan raised the issue of Indian atrocities at UNO, New Delhi responded by raising Pakistan's alleged atrocities in Balochistan ("Indian raises 'Pakistan's," 2016; "India raises Balochistan," 2017; Haqqani, 2018). Thus, India wants to use its support for Baloch insurgents as a bargaining tool on IJK, i.e., New Delhi wants Islamabad to stop supporting Kashmir cause and in turn, India could stop sponsoring Baloch insurgents in Pakistan. The stable security situation in Pakistan could deprive India of its leverage and bargaining position against Islamabad's ability to create unrest and fan the flames of freedom in IHK.

### **CONCLUSION**

Indian irredentism towards the creation of Pakistan and consequent ambitions to undo partition and undermine TNT prompted the former to forcefully occupy J&K that became a major irritant in their bilateral relations. Later on, its ambitions to institute its domination in the region and undercut Pakistan's policy on IJK impelled New Delhi to inflict pain on Islamabad through waging surrogate warfare since the latter's inception. It used its surrogates within Pakistan's borders and beyond particularly Afghanistan.

In the immediate post-independence era, the issue of Pashtunistan served Indian interest. In fact, this issue was an Indian brainchild. One of the main reasons due to which India supported Afghanistan and KKT in KP on Pashtunistan issue was to embarrass Pakistan and weaken the latter's stance on IJK. New Delhi instigated or encouraged Afghanistan to raise Pashtunistan issue internationally analogous to how Islamabad highlighted IJK at global forums. Kabul through using Afghan soil also provided support to Baloch, Pashtun, Saraiki and Sindhi separatists throughout the cold war. However, it lost its influence after the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992, particularly after the Taliban captured Kabul and controlled most of Afghanistan in 1996. Nevertheless, India made renewed and profound efforts after the Taliban were ousted from power and a new government was formed in Kabul following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. During the Afghan civil war, India cultivated a strong coalition with the leaders of the Northern Alliance that it used after the latter came into power in the post 9/11 era. Consequently, New Delhi supported disgruntled political forces, resentful nationalists and separatist elements willing to serve as Indian surrogates for their own interests. India sought to use them either to threaten Pakistan's security and territorial integrity or to undermine the latter's policy on IJK.

In the post 9/11 scenario, India used a multi-prong strategy, ranging from propaganda to open threats of a military attack against Pakistan and the use of terrorist groups against Pakistan to force the latter to abandon its policy on IJK. New Delhi strove to undermine Pakistan's stance on IJK by two means: first, it tried to declare the ongoing armed struggle for independence in IHK as Pakistan's sponsored insurgency and to include it in the US-led war against terrorism, second; with or without US approval and support, it used Afghan soil to sponsor terrorist groups to operate in Balochistan, FATA, KP, and other areas of Pakistan. New Delhi made Baloch terror groups as its

surrogates to use them as a bargaining tool to force Pakistan compromise its Kashmir policy and abandon support for freedom fighters. It also used TTP to bleed Pakistan for similar objectives. Instability in Afghanistan serves Indian interests as New Delhi fears that peace in Afghanistan would relieve militants enabling them to operate against Indian occupation forces in IHK.

New Delhi wants to keep insurgencies and militancy to continue on Pakistan's western border to decrease pressure in IHK. New Delhi wants Pakistan to desist from providing moral and diplomatic assistance to Kashmiri people and supporting their cause of achieving the right to self-determination and highlighting atrocities in IHK at international forums. India particularly wants to use Baloch card for a compromise with Pakistan on IJK that Islamabad cannot afford to.

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